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ABSTRACT 
 
 A recognized issue related to the processes in systems engineering is that they 
vary based on the project and organization.  However, understanding how to tailor the 
systems engineering processes to help ensure project success continues to trouble 
engineers, and practical tools to help aid engineers in this field are not as readily available 
as many would like.  Moreover, budget and schedule constraints continue to place an 
additional burden on systems engineering being done well.  Many studies on how to help 
contribute to improving systems engineering exists for different organizations.  Yet, most 
studies are based on case studies from one project, involve a small sample size, or only 
focus on one organization type.  This thesis discusses the results of how systems 
engineering processes applied to complex projects impact project success based on 
organization type with a sample size of 180 institutions.  The organizations examined are 
divided into two groups, commercial organizations and government organizations.  
Within the commercial organization, government-focused projects and commercial-
focused projects are examined.  Within the government organization, projects from the 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Agency are examined.  NASA 
is a government organization comprised of 10 Centers located around the country, and for 
the purpose of this research, is the primary organization discussed and metric in which 
the other organizations will be quantitatively compared and contrasted against.  For this 
reason, the standard participants used in this research effort were NASA’s 17 systems 
engineering processes.  Data was gathered through a modified data collection instrument, 
 viii 
and a three-level data analysis was performed.  First, meaningful correlations were 
identified between the systems engineering processes and project success metrics, as well 
as, non-technical variables and project success metrics for the different organizations.  
Then, a deeper data analysis was conducted to test for statistically significant differences 
through project description variables, project success metrics, and systems engineering 
processes across organization types.  Finally, statistically significant differences among 
the project description variables, project success metrics, systems engineering processes, 
and non-technical variables were examined within each organization type.  The results 
from the data analysis will be delivered to NASA to help aid in the development of a 
NASA systems engineering practitioners guide. 
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CHAPTER 1. GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
 
Systems Engineering at NASA 
Systems engineering occurs in all types of organization in an official or unofficial 
capacity.  For example, at NASA systems engineering is a formal process that is applied 
to projects of all sizes.  Whether the project is a cube satellite with a three-year lifecycle 
or the space launch system (SLS) with a 30-year lifecycle, there are engineers who are 
assigned to the specific task of overseeing the project’s system.  However, systems 
engineering is not only conducted in industry.  For example, when a family buys a new 
car or even the weekly groceries, they apply systems engineering techniques.  A grocery 
list and budget prioritize the family’s shopping trip’s requirements, and informal trade 
studies are conducted to determine whether fuel economy or vehicle capacity is most 
important based on the family’s vehicle needs.   However, the exact manner in which the 
systems engineering processes are utilized will vary based on the organization and 
project.  Systems engineering processes for a simple project, like grocery shopping, 
might consist mostly of mental checks and post-it notes, whereas a complex system like 
SLS will require rigorous forms and official procedures.   
The organizations in any given industry, as well as the types of projects that they 
work on, will typically vary widely.  Therefore, applying a single standardized systems 
engineering process across an entire industry is inappropriate.  In fact, doing so can 
actually increase project complexity.  However, knowing how to optimally tailor these 
processes based on project type and in differing organizations continues to challenge 
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systems engineers.  Furthermore, practical tools to aid systems engineers in overcoming 
these challenges are not always readily available (NASA, 2014).   
Addressing these challenges is critical to NASA, which operates on a tight 
government budget.  The 2014 fiscal year budget for NASA was about $17.7 billion in 
discretionary funds, a decrease of about $50 million below the 2012 enacted level (The 
White House, 2014).  The requested budget for 2015 is about $17.4 billion (NASA, 
2014).  However, projects at NASA are not becoming less complex, nor are the 
stakeholders involved any less demanding with regard to complex project success.  
Therefore, systems engineering across the Agency must be done as effectively and 
efficiently as possible. 
The research described in this thesis addresses these problems by identifying how 
the systems engineering processes applied to complex projects impact project success 
based on organization type.  A sample size of 180 institutions was divided into two 
general categories, government organizations and commercial organizations.  Projects 
occurring within commercial organizations were then categorized as being either 
government-focused or commercial-focused.  The National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration (NASA) Agency, which is a government organization, comprised of 10 
Centers located throughout the United States is the primary focus for this research effort.  
Figure 1 illustrates the NASA Systems Engineering Engine, which displays the 17 
systems engineering processes NASA uses when conducting a project.   
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Figure 1.  The NASA Systems Engineering Engine (NASA, 2007) 
 
This research synthesizes the results from a three-part study: a 2007 Marshall 
Space Flight Center (MSFC) Flight Hardware study, a 2013 Government and 
Commercial Organizations study, and a 2014 NASA Agency study.  Data from the three 
studies was analyzed on three levels.  The first analysis assessed the data to identify 
meaningful correlations between the systems engineering processes and project success 
metrics.  Meaningful correlations between non-technical variables, such as teamwork, 
and projects success metrics among NASA projects were also identified.  From this area 
of the research, we can see which systems engineering processes more highly correlate 
with project success, and compare and contrast those findings with meaningful 
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correlations on government-focused commercial projects and commercial-focused 
commercial projects.   
Next, a richer data analysis was conducted to test for statistically significant 
differences among all organizations based upon project description variables, project 
success metrics, and the systems engineering processes. The final analysis tested for 
statistically significant differences among the project description variables, project 
success metrics, systems engineering processes, and non-technical variables within each 
organization. 
The provide insight into whether certain variables used for determining project 
success across the NASA Agency are similar or different to those being used on 
government-focused commercial projects and commercial-focused commercial projects. 
Through this research, we hope to gain a better understanding of how the NASA Centers 
organize their systems engineering processes and whether these processes are conduced 
in a manor that ensures project success and efficient resource utilization.  Results from 
the data analysis will contribute to NASA’s development of a NASA systems engineering 
practitioners guide.  Additionally, since this study examines government and commercial 
organizations, the findings will also be transferrable to projects in other industries, such 
as aerospace and defense. 
 
Thesis Organization 
 Figure 2 outlines the research plan this thesis will follow.  Chapters 2 and 3 
discuss in more detail the research problem, motivation, and contribution that were 
introduced in Chapter 1.  Chapter 2 begins by identifying the research problem and the 
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motivation for addressing this problem.  A review of the relevant literature review then 
follows, focusing on the three areas of systems engineering effectiveness that are most 
important to this research.  Next, the methodology of how the 2014 NASA data was 
collected and integrated into the 2007 MSFC Flight Hardware and 2013 Government and 
Commercial Organizations is study.  Finally, an analysis of the data is presented, 
followed by a discussion of the results and their implications.  Chapter 3 discusses 
general conclusions drawn from the NASA systems engineering effectiveness phase of 
the study, limitations of the study, and recommendations for future areas of research in 
the field based on from the study’s findings. 
 
 
Figure 2. Research Plan Flow Chart 
  
!
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CHAPTER 2. IDENTIFYING RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN SYSTEMS 
ENGINEERING PROCESSES AND PROJECT SUCCESS IN NASA COMPLEX 
PROJECTS AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS 
 
Kathryne Schomburg1, 2, Paul Componation3*, Caroline Krejci2, Bob Stephenson4 
 
A paper to be submitted to The Journal of Systems Engineering 
 
Abstract 
 A recognized issue related to the processes in systems engineering is that they 
vary based on the project and organization.  However, understanding how to tailor the 
systems engineering processes to help ensure project success continues to trouble 
engineers, and practical tools to help aid engineers in this field are not as readily available 
as many would like.  Moreover, budget and schedule constraints continue to place an 
additional burden on systems engineering being done well.  Many studies on how to help 
contribute to improving systems engineering exists for different organizations.  Yet, most 
studies are based on case studies from one project, involve a small sample size, or only 
focus on one organization type.  This thesis discusses the results of how systems 	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University of Texas at Arlington, Arlington, TX 76019 
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engineering processes applied to complex projects impact project success based on 
organization type with a sample size of 180 institutions.  The organizations examined are 
divided into two groups, commercial organizations and government organizations.  
Within the commercial organization, government-focused projects and commercial-
focused projects are examined.  Within the government organization, projects from the 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Agency are examined.  NASA 
is a government organization comprised of 10 Centers located around the country, and for 
the purpose of this research, is the primary organization discussed and metric in which 
the other organizations will be quantitatively compared and contrasted against.  For this 
reason, the standard participants used in this research effort were NASA’s 17 systems 
engineering processes.  Data was gathered through a modified data collection instrument, 
and a three-level data analysis was performed.  First, meaningful correlations were 
identified between the systems engineering processes and project success metrics, as well 
as, non-technical variables and project success metrics for the different organizations.  
Then, a deeper data analysis was conducted to test for statistically significant differences 
through project description variables, project success metrics, and systems engineering 
processes across organization types.  Finally, statistically significant differences among 
the project description variables, project success metrics, systems engineering processes, 
and non-technical variables were examined within each organization type.  The results 
from the data analysis will be delivered to NASA to help aid in the development of a 
NASA systems engineering practitioners guide. 
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Introduction 
Whether a team at NASA is working on a three-year lifecycle cube satellite 
project, the 30+-year lifecycle space launch system (SLS), a robotics project, or a 
research project, there is a team of engineers who are tasked with specifically overseeing 
that project’s system.  What this means for NASA is systems engineering is a formal 
process no matter the project’s size. 
However, systems engineering is occurring in more organizations than just 
NASA, especially when considering the official and unofficial procedures any project 
undergoes.  As stated above there are organizations in the government sector, such as 
NASA, that do have official systems engineering procedures.  Outside of NASA and the 
government sector, systems engineering is also conducted in commercial businesses and 
even a family’s household.  Systems engineering processes are utilized in the aerospace 
industry when new commercial aircrafts are designed, and trade studies are conducted 
when a family decides whether fuel economy or size is more important when purchasing 
a new vehicle. 
Because systems engineering is utilized in vastly different project types in some 
capacity or another, it is important to know how and when to tailor the systems 
engineering processes based on project type and complexity.  Unfortunately, tailoring the 
systems engineering processes is easier said than done, and NASA is a prime example for 
highlighting the challenges in tailoring these processes based on the project.  Practical 
tools and examples to aid systems engineers in tailoring the systems engineering 
processes to their particular project continue to not be as readily available as many 
engineers would like (NASA, 2014).  Even more so than at just NASA, different 
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organization types exist and project types vary within those organizations.  Therefore, 
having one standardized systems engineering process to apply across a sector can be a 
factor in increasing project complexity. 
Relevant research and tools on how to tailor systems engineering processes to 
complex projects to ensure project success based on organization type does exist, 
however, it is still not as present as many would like.  The research that has been 
conducted on how to tailor systems engineering processes to projects mostly consists of a 
combination of the following: case studies from a single project, small sample sizes, 
focusing on only one organization type, or results that are only qualitative in their 
analysis.  An example of this is when a group of systems engineering branch chiefs meet 
to discuss how the systems engineering processes at NASA can be better tailored to a 
project.  The amount of knowledge and experience among the branch chiefs meeting in 
this type of situation is invaluable, yet more qualitative in nature versus an intentional 
quantitative analysis.  Quantitative research with a strong sample size is necessary to help 
with the budget and schedule constraints placed on projects carrying high standards of 
expectation for success. 
NASA operates on a tight government budget and due to the reasons stated above, 
believes this research effort is of interest for the NASA Agency, as well as other 
organization types.  The 2014 fiscal year budget for NASA was about $17.7 billion in 
discretionary funds, a decrease of about $50 million below the 2012 enacted level (The 
White House, 2014).  The requested budget for 2015 is about $17.4 billion (NASA, 
2014).  These budgets illustrate how NASA must continue to successfully develop 
complex projects on an evermore-restrictive budget.   
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Therefore, NASA being forced to operate on a reduced budget is the motivation 
for systems engineering across the Agency to be done as well as possible.  With this 
motivation stated, research is needed to identify which systems engineering processes 
NASA engineers place greatest emphasis on in determining a project’s success, and how 
these areas of emphasis differ from government-focused projects and commercial-
focused projects in commercial organizations.   
Findings from this research will contribute to NASA to help aid in the 
development of a NASA systems engineering practitioners guide.  Additionally, since 
this study examines government-focused projects and commercial-focused projects in 
commercial organizations, the findings will be transferrable to projects to other 
industries, for example the aerospace and defense industries. 
The primary goal of this thesis is to quantitatively identify how the systems 
engineering processes applied to complex projects impact project success based on 
organization type with a sample size of 180 institutions.  In the commercial sector, 
organization type is divided into two general groups, government-focused projects in 
commercial organizations and commercial-focused projects in commercial organizations.  
An additional group is also recognized, the National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration (NASA) Agency.  NASA is a government organization comprised of 10 
Centers located around the country.  In this research effort, NASA will be the primary 
organization discussed and the metric in which the other government organizations and 
commercial organizations are being compared and contrasted against.  For this reason, 
figure 1 is provided to illustrate the NASA Systems Engineering Engine; which displays 
the 17 systems engineering processes NASA uses when managing a project.  NASA’s 17 
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systems engineering processes serve as the systems engineering processes used in this 
study.  For additional information regarding the descriptions of each of NASA’s 17 
systems engineering processes, please see questions (25 – 41) in Appendix B, “Term 
Descriptions.  
Figure 2 outlines the research plan for the study to be discussed.  The research 
analyzes a three-part study: a 2007 Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) Flight 
Hardware study, a 2013 Government and Commercial Organizations study, and a 2014 
NASA Agency study.  In order to address the three parts of this study, a literature review 
focusing on the three areas relating to systems engineering effectiveness is first 
conducted. Second, a methodology section discusses how the 2014 NASA data was 
collected and integrated into the data from the 2007 MSFC Flight Hardware and 2013 
Government and Commercial Organizations studies.   
Third, a results and data analysis section summarizes the study’s findings through 
three levels of analysis.  In the first level, data from the three studies is quantitatively 
compared and contrasted to identify meaningful correlations between the systems 
engineering processes and project success metrics, as well as, the non-technical variables 
and project success metrics based on organization type.  Second, a richer data analysis is 
conducted to test for statistically significant differences among organizations based upon 
project description variables, project success, metrics, and the systems engineering 
processes across organization types.  The third level of the data analysis tests for 
statistically significant variable differences within each organization based upon project 
description variables, project success, metrics, the systems engineering processes, and 
non-technical variables. 
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The results look to gather additional insight into whether certain variables used 
for determining project success across the NASA Agency are similar or different to those 
being used at other government organizations, as well as commercial organizations.  
Through this research, we hope to better understand how the NASA Centers organize 
their systems engineering processes and if these processes are organized in a manor to 
best ensure project success and resource utilization.  Finally, a conclusion summarizes the 
study and its findings, acknowledges the limitations of the study, and proposes 
recommendations for future work. 
 
Literature Review 
Overview and project success: 
Research has shown that project success depends on the implementation of 
systems engineering and project management methodologies.  In the context of this 
research, a project is defined as being successful if it all phases of its lifecycle were 
successfully completed.  In his research on project success, Couillard (1995) collected 
survey data and then applied a project management method developed by Pinto and 
Slevin (1988) to gain a better understanding of the connection between project success 
and project management techniques.  Six project success measures and eight variables 
from this research were used.  He found that project success is influenced by multiple 
factors.   For examples, the importance of having the project team know exactly what is 
expected from them, as well as needing to establish clear and effective communication 
within the project team.  Additionally, factors found to meaningfully influence project 
success were as follows: the degree to which the project team understands the level of 
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authority given to the project manager, how the project team handles problems, and 
communication among team (Couillard, 1995).  Therefore, project success could be 
influenced by both technical and non-technical variables.  A technical variable being a 
project input where physical measurements could be calculated and obtained.  An 
example of this is payload weight.  A non-technical variable is defined as a project input 
where physical measurements are unable to be calculated or obtained.  An example of a 
non-technical variable is teamwork.  
In addition to project success serving as a key indictor for effective systems 
engineering, a narrowed scope for this research must be defined.  The focus of this 
research effort is to determine which systems engineering processes are of highest value 
to systems engineers at NASA, and how those processes correlate to project success.  
Additionally, that information then needs to be compared and contrasted against 
government-focused projects and commercial-focused projects in commercial 
organizations, so that NASA as an Agency can clearly identify how systems engineering 
for them as a government organization differs from commercial organizations.  This 
again is important since a portion of the project work at NASA is contracted out to 
commercial organizations.  Finally, we want to begin introducing the exploration of how 
non-technical variables might impact project success at NASA. 
Therefore, for the purpose of this research the literature review discussed focuses 
on three main elements: (1) NASA systems engineering and integration effectiveness, (2) 
systems engineering for government-focused projects and commercial-focused projects in 
commercial organizations, and (3) project cost estimating with non-technical variables at 
NASA.  The first element identifies the work NASA has conducted internally to further 
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develop complex systems engineering effectiveness.  The second element summarizes 
key overall findings of systems engineering effectiveness in government and commercial 
organizations.  The third element discusses existing research that has attempted to 
identify appropriate non-technical variables to use in parametric cost modeling to help 
determine success in projects at NASA.   
 
1. NASA systems engineering and integration effectiveness: 
Through the development of his study, Couillard introduced the idea of examining 
the relationships between management techniques and project success based on 
individual complex systems projects.  His research pioneered the exploration of different 
correlations between variation in project management and project success for complex 
systems projects.  His research effort provided a basis for the first phase of the systems 
engineering effectiveness study discussed in this thesis.  This foundational stage was a 
2007 MSFC flight hardware systems engineering effectiveness study (Componation, 
Youngblood, Utley, & Farrington, 2008).  
The 2007 phase developed the foundation for the secondary and current phases of 
the study, as well as defining the project’s long-term goal.  The long-term goal is to 
identify statistical relationships for teams to effectively tailor their systems engineering 
processes (Componation, Youngblood, Utley, & Farrington, 2008).  The MSFC flight 
hardware study looked to determine the correlation between the extent of formal systems 
engineering, the integration process, and organizational implementation with 
programmatic and technical success.  The researchers evaluated the systems engineering 
approach and teaming effectiveness as related to project success.  Data for this project 
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was conducted through a series of interviews centered on the International Space 
Welding Experiment (ISWE) project (Componation, Youngblood, Utley, & Farrington, 
2008).  Further discussion of the MSFC flight hardware study can be viewed in figure 6 
in the Results and Data Analysis section. 
The application of systems engineering to NASA projects has evolved since the 
agency was created in 1958 (NASA, 2014).  In recent years, the evolution of NASA’s 
systems engineering standards has been observed via updates to its unofficial and official 
manuals.  For example, the 1994 Systems Engineering Handbook, “Tools, Techniques, 
and Lessons Learned” used a product-focused approach, while the 2007 Systems 
Engineering Handbook focused on processes (Heusner, 2013).  Today, systems engineers 
at NASA continue to use the 1994 product-focused NASA handbook and hope for 
additional practical, product-focused tools to be developed for use (NASA, 2014).  Most 
NASA centers develop their own internal systems engineering handbooks and tools to 
use.  For example, MSFC developed a practical handbook based on tools, techniques, and 
lessons learned that was used for the majority of the 1990’s and 2000’s (Science and 
Engineering Systems Analysis and Integration Laboratory, Systems Definition Division, 
1994).   
Another example of differences between organizational systems engineering 
standards and actual implementation at the Centers involves the structure used to describe 
the system life cycle.  The systems engineering “Vee” chart, displayed in Figure 3, was 
initially developed by NASA as part of the Software Management and Assurance 
Program and was further developed by Forsberg and Mooz (Forsberg & Mooz, 1991).  In 
2007, NASA transitioned to the agency standard which defines the 17 systems 
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engineering processes that was introduced in Figure 1 (NASA, 2007).  However, most 
Centers were and are still using the systems engineering “Vee” chart. 
 
 
Figure 3. Systems Engineering “Vee” 
 
 Internal research at NASA has been conducted with the goal of continuing to 
improve systems engineering effectiveness within the agency.  NASA’s motivation is 
strongly tied to the need for mission success.  With increasing complexity due to the 
integration of hardware and software into projects, the challenge of engineering the 
systems to meet cost, schedule, and performance requirements within acceptable levels of 
risk has increased primarily due to the integration of hardware and software into projects 
(Andary, So, & Breindel, 2008).  Prior to the standardization of official systems 
engineering processes at NASA, when the systems engineers identified technical risks, 
the project manager was notified to discuss how to reduce the risk.  However, during 
these times, due to cost and schedule, the project manager would generally refuse to 
approve the recommended technical solution and either accept the risk or implement a 
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portion of the recommended solution.  In an attempt to mitigate this issue, Centers have 
developed tools to aid the Mission Systems Engineers.  For example, Goddard Space 
Flight Center developed the “GOLD Rules” and a System Engineering Requirements 
Traceability tool (Andary, So, & Breindel, 2008).   The purpose of these tools is to 
provide a direction for project managers to go in when systems engineers discover an 
issue.  Putting these procedures in place help stop issues from being ignored due to cost 
and schedule problems. 
 NASA has also used projects such as the Morpheus project as a challenge to tailor 
the traditional NASA systems engineering approach to be more appropriate for a lower 
cost, rapid prototype engineering effort without interfering with the integrity of the 
systems engineering processes (Devolites & Hart, 2013).  NASA’s Morpheus project 
developed and tested a prototype planetary lander designed to serve as a test-bed for 
advanced spacecraft technologies. The Morpheus project was suitable for this experiment 
because the majority of civil servants at the time were either working on the Space 
Shuttle Program, the International Space Station Program, or the Constellation Program, 
so Morpheus’s small team provided feasibility.  Furthermore, the Morpheus project was 
not required to show compliance with NASA Procedural Requirements 7120.5, allowing 
the project’s team to operate more freely.  The experiment with the Morpheus project was 
successful.  It was robust, efficient compared to alternatives, and unintended 
consequences were minimized (Devolites & Hart, 2013).   
 From NASA’s recent missions, the Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics 
Laboratory (APL) used the NASA Cost Instrument Cost Model databases to identify 
trends in project management and systems engineering effort (Shinn, Wolfarth, & Hahn, 
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2010).  Recent APL projects have shown clear increases in both the estimated and 
realized costs for systems engineering and project management activities but no 
definitive rationale to explain the upward trend.  However, cost estimating relationships 
of the most widely-used mission and instrument cost models provide little 
acknowledgement that project management/systems engineering costs are driven by 
anything other than hardware and software costs, nor how management and engineering 
initiatives, policy changes, or risk considerations are driving project management/systems 
engineering growth (Shinn, Wolfarth, & Hahn, 2010).  Researcher at APL believe the 
reasons are an absence of data from recent missions subject to the effects of NASA NPR 
7120.5D and other policies, earned value and other initiatives, unreliable and inconsistent 
cost project management/systems engineering data, and perhaps most critically a 
perceived lack of interest until recently in understanding project management/systems 
engineering costs (Shinn, Wolfarth, & Hahn, 2010). 
 
2. Systems engineering effectiveness: 
Systems engineers at NASA continue to appreciate the 1994 product-focused 
handbook and hope for additional practical, product-focused tools to be developed in the 
future (NASA, 2014).  However, in addition to the development of practical tools for 
NASA to use internally, their relationship with commercial organizations is also crucial 
to their success.  The reason, again, is because NASA contracts out many portions of 
their projects to commercial organizations.  Therefore, understanding systems 
engineering effectiveness in commercial organizations for government-focused projects 
and commercial-focused projects is important.  By understanding systems engineering 
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effectiveness in commercial organizations, we will be able to better map NASA’s 
relationship to commercial organizations, and therefore better determine a project’s 
success. 
After the 2007 MSFC flight hardware phase of the study, the project transitioned 
to a 2013 study examining systems engineering effectiveness in government-focused 
projects and commercial-focused projects in commercial organizations.  The study 
focused on organizations in the Midwest and Southeast regions of the United States 
(Hansen, 2013).  For this phase of the study, a data collection instrument was developed 
for the participants to use consisting of 50 questions, and used NASA’s 17 systems 
engineering processes as the systems engineering standards to survey against.   The data 
collection instrument will be discussed in more detail in the Methodology section.  
Participants in this phase of the study totaled to 129: 83 commercial-focused projects’ 
participants and 46 government-focused projects’ participants. (Hansen, 2013).  In this 
research, correlation matrices were developed to compare and contrast NASA’s 17 
systems engineering processes and Couillard’s project success metrics from the 2007 
phase and 2013 phases of the study.  Meaningful correlations will also be further 
referenced in the Methodology section of this article. 
The data from all three phases of this study was gathered through surveying 
systems engineers.  Survey research has the potential to advance the maturity of systems 
engineering research.  Specifically, applying systems engineering to survey research 
enhances the performance of various survey related activities.  Based on survey research, 
recommendations on how systems engineering can improve are through performing an 
in-depth analysis of the requirements of all the stakeholders in the survey and leveraging 
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the framework for risk and opportunity management offered by systems engineering to 
address survey data threats to validity (Smartt & Ferreira, 2013). 
Systems engineering is often integrated into a project based on current standards; 
however, these standards contain inconsistencies (INCOSE, 2014).  These inconsistencies 
are mainly because systems engineers continue to struggle with the basic mathematical 
relationships that control the development of systems (Honour, 2004).  Consequently, 
practitioners will use heuristics learned during their personal career experiences to guide 
them in systems engineering.  By using heuristics, relationships between project cost and 
schedule, technical value, technical size, technical complexity, and technical quality are 
better applied by being more tailored to the specific project’s needs, but they have also 
made the value of systems engineering to projects impossible to quantify (Sheard, 2000).  
This is because there is no way to quantify the value of systems engineering when each 
project is being managed based on heuristics of an individual systems engineer’s 
experiences.  Each project becomes unique in some manor.  Another challenge in valuing 
systems engineering is the difficulty in quantifying intuitive understanding of the value of 
reducing risk (Honour, 2004).  This is problematic, since the primary purpose of systems 
engineering concepts and processes is reducing risk early to avoid integration and test 
problems, thereby reducing cost and shortening schedules. 
To address these challenges, a three-year initiative was conducted to transform 
classical systems engineering measures into leading indicators.  Systems engineering 
leading indicators are measures for evaluating the effectiveness of the systems 
engineering activities on a program in a manner that provides information about impacts 
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that are likely to affect the system or program performance objectives (Rhodes, Valerdi, 
& Roedler, 2008). 
In an effort to better understand how systems engineering is utilized on a project-
by-project basis, the defense sector has been examined in the literature.  Defense projects 
are similar to NASA projects, but both are different from other industrial projects.  
Defense projects are usually large, complex, and interdisciplinary.  They also use state-
of-the-art technologies in order to achieve the required operational performance, thus 
increasing the technological risk involved in their execution (Tishler, Dvir, Shenhar, & 
Lipovetsky, 1995).  Factors found to be critical to the success of defense projects are: 
urgency of need, quality of the follow-up team, pre-project preparation, quality of the 
development team and of its manager, professional growth and continuity, design policy 
of the developing organization, design considerations in the early phases of the 
development cycle, systematic use of methods to control schedule, budget, and 
performance (Tishler, Dvir, Shenhar, & Lipovetsky, 1995).  Additionally, project success 
has been determined to be positively correlated with the investment in requirements 
definition and development of technical specifications (Tishler, Dvir, Shenhar, & 
Lipovetsky, 1995).  All of these factors also have the potential to heavily impact project 
success within NASA projects. By contrast, findings in defense studies suggest that 
project success is insensitive to the level of implementation of management processes and 
procedures, which are readily supported by modern computerized tools and project 
management training (Tishler, Dvir, Shenhar, & Lipovetsky, 1995).   
Additionally, the utilization of Bayesian Belief Networks has been used as a 
method to better understand systems engineering effectiveness within the Department of 
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Defense.  Bayesian Belief Networks were used to create causal maps to model 
relationships present in government acquisitions of complex information systems and 
create a systems engineering effectiveness index model to identify and analyze systems 
engineering patterns and predict possible areas of systems engineering performance risk 
(Doskey, Mazzuchi, & Sarkani, 2013).  The causal map in this approach broke systems 
engineering effectiveness into three areas: technical, business, and leadership. Results 
from the study showed successful projects to have a higher correlation across all 
capabilities with stakeholder management.  
Locatelli, Mancini, and Romano examined projects delivered in complex 
environments that are often late, over-budget and providing fewer benefits that what were 
originally expected.  They determined systems engineering to be the emerging paradigm 
in complex project environments that transform project governance from “project based” 
to “system based” and thereby increase the chance of holistic success (Locatelli, Mancini, 
& Romano, 2013). This research presents systems engineering tools and techniques 
focusing, in particular, on the most relevant for project management, project governance 
and stakeholder management.  
Current methods in systems engineering apply decomposition to knowledge, 
functionality, and product structures.  This requires excellent integration and optimization 
applied in a coordinated way.  A more complex system does not necessarily result in a 
more difficult operational employment.   A case can be made that recent systems that are 
very complex from a development perspective can be easy to employ (Grady, 2009).  
This finding is also supported in more recent studies.  Elm and Goldenson found research 
does indicate that when projects properly apply systems engineering best practices, they 
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tend to perform better than projects that do not (Elm & Goldenson, 2012).  Findings such 
as these were motivating factors for a continuing phase to the 2007 MSFC flight 
hardware study. 
Due to the complexities project management teams must consider such as novelty 
and risk management strategy in order to determine the integration of benefits and risks, 
decision-making tools have been proposed.  Such tools hope to help the project manager 
choose the best way to improve project success rates while controlling the level of risks 
(Marmier, Gourc, & Laarz, 2013).  However, these tools can sometimes increase project 
complexity if a foundational phase of the tool’s model is to generate all possible project 
scenarios.  Potential project scenarios are generally difficult to foreshadow in unique 
complex engineering projects, such as the ones conduced by NASA.  Moreover, project 
failures have been known to be caused by: uncertainty in the way projects must be 
governed, scope ambiguity, technical complexity, and involvement of a large number of 
partners with different cultures and different ways of work (Van Marrewijk A. , 2004), 
(Van Marrewijk, Clegg, Pitsis, & Veenswijk, 2008). 
 
3. Project cost estimating with non-technical variables at NASA: 
 The final element in this literature review discusses specific research conducted 
by Hamaker regarding how non-technical variables can influence project success from a 
systems engineering perspective at NASA.  This section summarizes how the non-
technical variables in our study were identified for use and why they are important to this 
research effort. 
 25 
 The general problem in space project cost estimating is predicting the cost of 
projects early in their formulation phase in order to make accurate commitments on what 
the project is likely to cost.  Parametric cost models are typically used because in the 
early stages of project definition, insufficient detailed information is known to perform 
other types of estimates, such as detailed engineering estimates that are based on a labor 
and material buildup of cost.  Parametric estimating equations that define the relationship 
between the independent variables and cost are usually based on historical information.  
Hamaker’s study looked at the influence of non-technical variables in NASA projects and 
used documentation from 150 projects establishing engineering management variables 
(Hamaker & Componation, 2005). 
 Figure 4 identifies all main variables examined for determining the appropriate 
parametric cost model.  For the purposes of this research, non-technical variables only 
will be discussed.  Figure 4 shows how a correlation analysis using Pearson’s product 
moment correlation was conducted as the analytical approach.  The engineering 
management variables were correlated against cost, with cost acting as the dependent 
variable.  As discussed earlier in Couillard’s article, any correlation with 0.4 or greater is 
considered to be indicative of a significant correlation was used. 
 For the sake of being thorough, our study used non-technical variables having a 
correlation almost to 0.4 or greater.  These eight variables are highlighted within the 
boxes below: team experience, requirements volatility, funding constraints, development 
duration, level of testing, number of science organizations, degree of formulation study, 
and new design factor. 
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Figure 4. Pearson’s Correlation to Cost 
  
 This paper further describes how the engineering management variables identified 
above are used in parametric cost model regression equation to improve predictive 
capabilities.  The general problem in space project cost estimating is predicting the cost 
of projects early enough in their formulation phase in order to make accurate 
commitments on what the project is likely to cost.  These commitments are made to the 
project stakeholders (Hamaker & Componation, 2011). 
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Methodology 
 Because this research is a continuation of the 2007 MSFC flight hardware study 
and 2013 government and commercial organizations study, the focus of this section is to 
describe the process that was used to gather data for the 2014 NASA Agency study.  
Therefore, this methodology will be specifically discussing the 2014 NASA Agency 
study.  However, the methodologies for the 2007 MSFC flight hardware study and 2013 
government and commercial organizations study gathered data in a similar fashion to the 
2014 NASA Agency study, using a data collection instrument.  To maintain consistency 
with the previous studies, it was determined that the use of a new data collection 
instrument for this study was not appropriate.  Instead a modified version of the previous 
data collection instrument was used.  This is summarized in table 1. 
 
Table 1. Modified Data Collection Instrument 
Section Question Set 
1 Basic demographics of the engineer’s organization 
2 Descriptive information on a specific project the engineer worked on 
3 How successful was the project 
4 What systems engineering processes were used 
5 Information on how the engineer interacted with his/her distributed team 
members 
6 Influence of non-technical variables in contributing to project success 
7 Information on the project’s communication and organization level 
8 Informal subsystems integration strategies 
 
 
Sections 1 through 5 were included in the original data collection instrument from the 
2013 study and are comprised of 50 questions.  Sections 6 through 8 increased the 
number of questions to 79 for the 2014 study.  Section 6 measures the influence of non-
technical variables influencing project success, and were formatted through the research 
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conducted on space project cost estimating with project management variables, as well as 
internal research conducted within NASA (Hamaker & Componation, 2011), (Chapline).   
A non-technical variable is defined as a project input where physical measurements are 
unable to be calculated or obtained.  An example of a non-technical variable is teamwork.  
The influence of non-technical variables in systems engineering is of interest to this 
research because research has shown non-technical variables such as teamwork do impact 
a project’s success.  However, quantitatively measuring this impact of non-technical 
variables in systems engineering is still an undefined area of research.  Our 2014 NASA 
Agency study uses the data from the NASA Agency participants to quantitatively 
measure the influence of non-technical variables in systems engineering project success. 
Sections 7 and 8 are collaboration efforts with joint researchers and will not be discussed 
in this paper.  Most questions in sections 1 through 5 were left untouched, except for a 
few modifications to the jargon to make the questions NASA-specific since the 2013 data 
collection instrument was written for individuals in government-focused projects and 
commercial-focused projects in commercial organizations.  
 The 2013 study used a 4-point Likert response scale to avoid overwhelming 
participants with too many response options.  This addressed the concern that participants 
would be discouraged from choosing an answer and would instead opt for the “Not 
Applicable” option (Hansen, 2013).  Fortunately, it was determined that this concern was 
unwarranted.  Furthermore, participants in the 2013 study communicated a need for more 
granularity among response options.  Therefore, the 2014 study transitioned to using a 7-
point Likert response scale (including a “Not Applicable” option) in hopes of gleaning 
greater insights from the participants’ responses.  For consistency, the 2014 dataset 
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responses were scaled to a 4-point scale, shown in table 2, based on the assumption that 
the Likert scale operates on a linear scale. 
 
Table 2. Likert Response Scale Conversion Table 
2013 Study New Scale 2014 Study 
Strongly Agree 4 4 Strongly Agree 7 
 3.5 Agree 6 
Agree 3 3 Somewhat Agree 5 
 2.5 Neither Agree nor Disagree 4 
Disagree 2 2 Somewhat Disagree 3 
 1.5 Disagree 2 
Strongly Disagree 1 1 Strongly Disagree 1 
 
 
 Once the development of the modified data collection instrument was completed, 
it underwent an alpha test once its preparations were completed.  The alpha test was 
conducted with NASA subject matter experts (SMEs) in early Spring 2014 to ensure the 
data collection instrument questions were clear and logical for NASA systems engineers 
to understand (Schomburg, Componation, & Krejci, 2014).  All SMEs either worked 
directly for NASA or were contracted employees with work supporting NASA projects. 
The SMEs were supplied the data collection instrument in the same online format as the 
participants were to receive it in and reviewed each question to approve question 
appropriateness and section location.  The SMEs provided suggestions and comments to 
improve the quality of the modified data collection instrument, as well as the study 
overall.  The SMEs reviewed each question to approve its appropriateness and section 
location, and they provided feedback to improve the quality of the modified data 
collection instrument, as well as the overall study.  Since the 2014 phase of the study was 
a continuation of a larger study, most questions had already been vetted and therefore no 
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notable alterations to the modified data collection instrument were deemed necessary.  To 
encourage participant feedback, an additional open-ended question was provided at the 
end of each question set where participants could provide comments to clarify and/or 
elaborate on their responses.  For further information on the 2014 modified data 
collection instrument, please see Appendix A, “Modified Data Collection Instrument” 
where all questions and answer options are listed. 
 Once the alpha test was completed, a beta test was conducted using only NASA 
systems engineers.  These engineers were all selected from different NASA Centers to 
provide as much perspective as possible.  Only one question, Project Description 
Question 7, which sought to identify the project’s primary focus, needed re-wording in 
the beta test’s phase to confirm the question’s appropriateness for NASA systems 
engineers.  Due to the small number of modifications requiring attention in the beta test, 
the data collection instrument revisions were taken care of relatively quickly.   
 The data for the 2014 NASA phase of the study was gathered through purposeful 
sampling and targeted sampling.  Purposeful sampling involves selecting information-
rich cases for in-depth studies.  Information-rich cases are those from which one can 
learn a great deal about issues of central importance for the purpose of research (Patton, 
1990).  For the purpose of this research, NASA systems engineers are considered to be a 
part of a hidden population, difficult to directly access for studies.  This is because civil 
servants are frequently surveyed for government research and the focus of many studies 
(NASA, 2014).  Therefore, we surveyed them through targeted sampling.  Targeted 
sampling provides a cohesive set of research methods that can help researchers study 
social problems existing among populations that are difficult to reach due to their lack of 
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visibility (Watters & Biernacki, 1989).  In order for the data collection instrument to 
reach systems engineers and systems engineering practitioners at NASA, networks were 
developed.  Relationships with key individuals at NASA Centers were established so 
contacts at their Centers and others could be obtained for Center deployment.  At this 
point, an initial list of contacts from all ten NASA Centers was compiled for survey 
deployment.  Round 1 of the survey was deployed on July 17, 2014.  Multiple rounds of 
the modified data collection instrument were deployed to allow for engineers to 
participate in the study who had not had the chance to participate in a previous round. 
 The modified data collection instrument was deployed two more times to the 
systems engineers across all the NASA Centers, and was officially closed in September 
2014.  In total, 51 usable responses were captured from NASA systems engineers from 
all 10 Centers, including NASA Headquarters.  Therefore, the data shown is 
representative of the whole Agency.  The 51 respondents were found by reaching out to 
all systems engineers at NASA.  The engineers were individually contacted to ask about 
willingness to participate in the study.  The 51 responders were essentially the engineers 
who expressed willingness to participate in the study when asked (Schomburg, Collopy, 
Componation, & Krejci, 2015). With the inclusion of the data from the 2013 government 
and commercial organization study’s data, a total of 180 survey responses were available 
for analysis.  Tables 3 and table 4 show the distribution of respondents from the various 
NASA Centers. 
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Table 3. Survey Participant Responses by NASA Center 
 
NASA Center Participant 
Responses 
Ames Research Center 3 
Glenn Research Center 2 
Goddard Flight Center 1 
Jet Propulsion Laboratory 7 
Johnson Space Center 2 
Kennedy Space Center 4 
Langley Research Center 9 
Marshall Space Flight Center 20 
NASA Headquarters 1 
Stennis Space Center 1 
Armstrong Flight Research Center 1 
 
 
Table 4. Survey Participant Responses by NASA Center Type 
 
Center Type Participant 
Responses 
Research Centers 11 
Flight Centers 5 
Robotics Centers 8 
Manned Centers 26 
Headquarters 1 
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By using participant responses from the 2007 and 2013 phases of the study in 
addition to the 2014 phases, a number of correlation matrices were calculated based on 
response data to survey sections 3 and 4, as well as sections 4 and 6, which are 
highlighted in table 5.   
 
Table 5. Focused Data Collection Instrument Sections for Correlation Tables 
Section Section Topic Correlation Matrices 
1 Demographics of Engineer’s Organization  
2 Descriptive Project Information  
3 Project Success Metrics X 
4 Systems Engineering Processes X 
5 Distributed Team Members’ Information  
6 Non-Technical Variables’ Interaction X 
7 Organization, Culture, and Communication  
8 Informal Subsystems Integration Strategies  
 
 
To ensure consistency and usability from all participant responses in the 2013 and 2014 
datasets, whenever a participant answered a question using the Not Applicable option, the 
response was coded into the data as “missing” and the value was subsequently imputed.  
Imputed data was generated in R using the Multivariate Imputation by Chained Equations 
(MICE) package.  The following defaults were used: predictive mean matching, logistic 
regression imputation, polytomous regression imputation for unordered categorical data, 
and the proportional odds model.  The MICE package then generated multiple 
imputations for incomplete multivariable data using the Gibbs sampling method.  The 
algorithm imputes an incomplete column by generating ‘plausible’ synthetic values given 
from other columns in the data (Stef van Buuren [aut, 2014).  The Gibbs sampler is a 
technique for generating random variables from a marginal distribution indirectly without 
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having to calculate the density and is also based on the elementary properties of Markov 
chains (Casella & George, 1992). 
 Once the missing values were imputed, a data analysis was conducted.  In this 
study, subjects were the institutions/participants; the predictor variables were: the 
organization type, question type, and an organization*question interaction; the response 
were the 180 institutions’ responses to each question.  Possible sources of bias might be 
present in each of the three phases of the overall study.  The 2007 MSFC flight hardware 
study collected data through interviews only and from one NASA Center.  The 2013 
government and commercial organizations study collected its data primarily in the 
Midwest and Southeast areas of the country.  The 2014 NASA Agency study allowed 
participants to respond based on projects where the lifecycle was not yet completed or the 
project was canceled, as well as completed projects.  Participation from the NASA 
Centers was also un-proportional.  Variability in the study came from two sources: the 
measurement tool and experimental unit.  Each institution participating in the study 
answered questions based upon their experiences, and therefore might be a source of 
variability.  Finally, how individuals view a Likert scale might differ.  Some individuals 
choose to use extremes such as ‘Strongly Agree’ or ‘Strongly Disagree’ where others do 
not, and therefore might be a source of variability. 
Six questions were researched through the use of matrices, and 19 hypotheses 
were tested through the use of one-way analysis of variance tables.  The following 
questions and hypotheses are listed in the order they will be addressed in the Results and 
Data Analysis section. 
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Matrices’ questions: 
Question 1: Do the systems engineering processes for the 2007 MSFC Flight 
Hardware study meaningfully correlate to the same project success metrics as the 2013 
Government and Commercial Organizations study? 
Question 2: Do the systems engineering processes for the 2007 MSFC Flight 
Hardware study meaningfully correlate to the same project success metrics as the 2014 
NASA Agency study?  
Question 3: Do the systems engineering processes for the 2013 Government and 
Commercial Organizations study meaningfully correlate to the same project success 
metrics as the 2014 NASA Agency study? 
Question 4: Do the systems engineering processes for the 2013 government-
focused projects meaningfully correlate to the same project success metrics as the 2014 
NASA Agency study? 
Question 5: Do the systems engineering processes for the 2013 commercial-
focused projects meaningfully correlate to the same project success metrics as the 2014 
NASA Agency study? 
Question 6: Which non-technical variables meaningfully correlate to project 
success metrics in the 2014 NASA Agency study? 
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Analysis of variance tables’ hypotheses: 
 Hypothesis 1: At least one organization effect does not equal zero in the Project 
Description Variables section of the modified data collection instrument. 
 Hypothesis 2: At least one question effect does not equal zero in the Project 
Description Variables section of the modified data collection instrument. 
 Hypothesis 3: At least one organization*question interaction effect does not equal 
zero in the Project Description Variables section of the modified data collection 
instrument. 
 Hypothesis 4: At least one organization effect does not equal zero in the Project 
Success Metrics section of the modified data collection instrument. 
 Hypothesis 5: At least one question effect does not equal zero in the Project 
Success Metrics section of the modified data collection instrument. 
 Hypothesis 6: At least one organization*question interaction effect does not equal 
zero in the Project Success Metrics section of the modified data collection instrument. 
 Hypothesis 7: At least one organization effect does not equal zero in the Systems 
Engineering Processes section of the modified data collection instrument. 
 Hypothesis 8: At least one question effect does not equal zero in the Systems 
Engineering Processes section of the modified data collection instrument. 
 Hypothesis 9: At least one organization*question interaction effect does not equal 
zero in the Systems Engineering Processes section of the modified data collection 
instrument. 
 Hypothesis 10: At least one question effect does not equal zero in the Project 
Description Variables section for government-focused projects. 
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 Hypothesis 11: At least one question effect does not equal zero in the Project 
Description Variables section for the commercial-focused projects. 
 Hypothesis 12: At least one question effect does not equal zero in the Project 
Description Variables section for NASA projects. 
 Hypothesis 13: At least one question effect does not equal zero in the Project 
Success Metrics section for the government-focused projects. 
 Hypothesis 14: At least one question effect does not equal zero in the Project 
Success Metrics section for the commercial-focused projects. 
 Hypothesis 15: At least one question effect does not equal zero in the Project 
Success Metrics section for NASA projects. 
 Hypothesis 16: At least one question effect does not equal zero in the Systems 
Engineering Processes section for government-focused projects. 
 Hypothesis 17: At least one question effect does not equal zero in the Systems 
Engineering Processes section for commercial-focused projects. 
 Hypothesis 18: At least one question effect does not equal zero in the Systems 
Engineering Processes section for NASA projects. 
 Hypothesis 19: At least one question effect does not equal zero in the Non-
Technical Variables section for NASA projects. 
 In an attempt to gain a qualitative understanding of the survey results, face-to-face 
interviews were conducted with a random sample of practicing systems engineers at 
NASA.  The goal in doing so was to ensure the findings discovered in the Results and 
Data Analysis section were in accordance with the quantitative and qualitative 
information discovered in the modified data collection instruments.  The interviews 
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hoped to gain insight similar to the April 2008 Systems Engineering Behaviors study; this 
study learned how systems engineers work on different projects in different programs at 
different Centers (Derro & Williams, 2009).  Therefore, the face-to-face interviews 
served as a quality check to the modified data collection instrument. 
 
Results and Data Analysis 
 In the Results and Data Analysis section, three levels of data analysis will be 
discussed.  The first level identifies matrices displaying meaningful correlations between 
NASA’s 17 systems engineering processes and Couillard’s 9 project success metrics for 
the 2007 MSFC flight hardware study, 2013 government and commercial organizations 
study, and 2014 NASA Agency study.  Also, a matrix identifying meaningful correlations 
between the non-technical variables and project success metrics from the 2014 NASA 
Agency study will also be displayed.  In all matrices, a correlation of 0.4 or greater was 
identified as meaningful.  Couillard used 0.4 as a notable value in his work, as did Elm 
(Couillard, 1995); (Elm & Goldenson, 2012).  The second level uses one-way analysis of 
variance tables to identify organizational differences among the project description 
variables, project success metrics, systems engineering processes, and non-technical 
variables.  The third section uses one-way analysis of variance tables to identify variable 
differences within each organization based on project description variables, project 
success metrics, systems engineering processes, and non-technical variables.  Finally, a 
discussion section relates the findings back to the initial research question. 
Based on the Gibbs sampler technique, it is important to note the correlations 
calculated in the following matrices are based off one imputation iteration.  The 2013 
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phase of the study had 3.4% of the responses missing, and the 2014 phase of the study 
had 6.7% of the responses missing.  Overall, 4.3% of the responses in the 180 participant 
surveys required an imputed value to conduct a proper data analysis.  Of the 180 
participants, 129 were from the 2013 government and commercial organizations study 
and 51 were from the 2014 NASA Agency study. 
1. Matrices showing correlations between project success metrics and systems 
engineering processes 
 
 
Figure 5. 2007 MSFC Flight Hardware Study and 2013 Government and 
Commercial Organizations Study 
 
Figure 5 identifies the correlations between the 17 systems engineering processes 
and 9 project success metrics from the 2007 and 2013 phases of the study (Hansen, 
2013).  The shaded cells indicate correlations of at least 0.4 for the 2007 NASA study, 
and the cells with numerical entries correspond to correlations of at least 0.4 for the 129 
participants in the 2013 study examining government-focused projects and commercial-
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focused projects in commercial organizations.  Figure 5 serves as the foundational matrix 
for the overall study.  The shaded cells in the 2007 study represent concentrated areas of 
correlations.  More specifically, product implementation, product integration, product 
verification, technical risk management, and configuration management all show strong 
positive correlation to technical success and overall project success from the organization 
view, as well as stakeholder view.  The 2013 study produced more sporadic results 
showing multiple meaningful correlations in technical planning and technical risk 
management, but not necessarily for the same project success metrics.  Overall, outside of 
the technical planning process little overlap between the two studies is displayed. 
 
 
Figure 6. 2007 MSFC Flight Hardware Study and 2014 NASA Study 
 
Figure 6 identifies meaningful correlations between the 17 systems engineering 
processes and 9 project success metrics in the 2007 MSFC flight hardware study and the 
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2014 NASA phase of the study.  The shaded cells again correspond to meaningful 
correlations in the 2007 study, but the numerical entries now indicate notable correlations 
among the 51 NASA systems engineering participants in the current phase of the 2014 
study.  Figure 6 does demonstrate more consistency within the matrix than figure 5 did; 
the 2014 NASA study produced more concentrated areas of meaningful correlations.  The 
increased consistency in this matrix is most likely due to both studies representing the 
NASA Agency in some form.  Although, intuition might suggest that the response from 
the two studies would be consistent, this is not the case.  For example, process 6, project 
integration, is more highly correlated with project success on every count except with 
budget relative to the original project plan in the 2014 NASA Agency study than in the 
2007 NASA MSFC flight hardware study.  Another notable finding is with process 13, 
technical risk management.  Technical risk management was highly correlated to 
technical success and overall project success in the 2007 MSFC flight hardware study; 
however, technical risk management was not significantly acknowledged in the 2014 
NASA Agency study at all.  A similar finding was discovered in process 14, 
configuration management.  Both studies found the process to meaningfully correlate to 
project success, but for different measures.  Finally, meaningful correlations dramatically 
increased in the 2014 study once the systems engineering processes reached the product 
focused processes, beginning starting at product implementation. 
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Figure 7. 2013 Government and Commercial Organizations Study and 2014 NASA 
Study 
 
Figure 7 represents the similarities and differences among the 2013 government 
and commercial organization study data and the 2014 NASA systems engineers’ 
responses.  The shaded cells indicate correlations of at least 0.4 in the 2013 government 
and commercial organization study data, while the cells with numerical entries 
correspond to correlations of at least 0.4 in the 2014 NASA Agency phase of the study.  
As one might suspect, there is no obvious consistent relationship between the two studies.  
Systems engineers at NASA produced almost twice as many meaningful correlations 
between processes and project success than the government and commercial 
organizations study as a whole.  The greater number of correlations in the NASA study 
could be an indication that NASA systems engineers place a higher value on systems 
engineering processes impacting project success than the government and commercial 
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organizations combined.  However, this may also be because the 2013 government and 
commercial organizations study sought to gain knowledge on the systems engineering 
processes from a more general level, where the 2014 NASA Agency study gathered 
knowledge on a specific government organization. 
 
 
Figure 8. 2013 Government-Focused Projects and 2014 NASA Study 
 
Figure 8 examines the similarities and differences among the 2013 government-
focused commercial projects’ organization data and the 2014 NASA systems engineers’ 
responses.  The shaded cells indicate correlations of at least 0.4 in the 2013 government-
focused project data, while the cells with numerical entries correspond to correlations of 
at least 0.4 in the 2014 NASA Agency phase of the study.  Both the 2013 government-
focused projects and 2014 NASA specific projects contain a large number of meaningful 
correlations.  However, the two studies display little overlap among meaningfully 
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correlated cells.  This might indicate the two studies disagree on how project success is 
determined relative to the systems engineering processes.  Interestingly though, when 
there is overlap, correlation values are fairly high.  An example of this is in product 
integration.  The 2014 NASA study produced a value of 0.7 correlating to overall project 
success from the organization view.  Overall, the processes considered to impact project 
success for NASA projects are almost completely different from those processes that 
participants working on government-focused projects in the commercial organization 
believe impact project success. 
 
 
Figure 9. 2013 Commercial-Focused Projects and 2014 NASA Study 
 
Figure 9 examines the similarities and differences among the data from the 2013 
commercial-focused projects study and the 2014 NASA systems engineers’ responses.  
The shaded cells indicate correlations of at least 0.4 in the 2013 commercial-focused 
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project data, while the cells with numerical entries correspond to correlations of at least 
0.4 in the 2014 NASA Agency study.  Interestingly, both commercial-focused projects 
and NASA projects consistently value process 6, product integration, and process 10, 
technical planning, as meaningfully correlating to project success.  Correlations in figure 
8 and figure 9 suggest that NASA systems engineers might approach the systems 
engineering processes more like commercial-focused projects than government-focused 
projects. 
 
 
 
Figure 10. 2014 NASA Study Non-Technical Variables 
 
 In addition to examining how the systems engineering processes correlate to 
project success, the impact of how non-technical variables correlated to project success 
was also studied for the 2014 NASA study.  Figure 10 illustrates these correlations of at 
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least 0.4.  These questions are based on section 6 of the modified data collection 
instrument.  However, not all questions were used because not all were asked on a 7-
point Likert scale and would not have been able to be coded appropriately.  The matrix 
produced interesting results despite its sparseness.  Familiarity in project details 
correlates relatively highly with schedule relative to the original project plan and relative 
to similar projects.  Team experience also correlates highly with staying on budget.  And 
finally, level of testing has a meaningful correlation with relative overall project success 
from a stakeholder perspective. 
2. ANOVA tables testing all 180 participants 
 Next, three one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) tables were constructed in 
JMP using data from all 180 participants from the 2013 government and commercial 
organizations study, as well as the 2014 NASA Agency study.  These three tables were 
constructed based on results from sections 2, 3, and 4 of the data collection instrument.  
General information on the design of the data analysis for JMP: the 180 participants were 
the subjects of the data collection, organization served as the whole plot between subjects 
factor, the participants were the different types of organizations, and the section’s 
questions were the sub plot within subjects factor.  Because each participant answered 
every question, there was a repeated measurement from the participants.  Participants 
were nested within organizations.  Organization refers to: government-focused 
commercial organization projects (1), commercial-focused commercial organization 
projects (2), NASA Agency projects (3).  Treatment effects were not examined since this 
was an observational study.  The area of highest interest from the ANOVA tables was if 
there were any differences among the organizations and what the interactions between the 
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organizations was, as well as if the groupings of questions were different based on 
organization. 
 The first ANOVA table corresponds to section 2 of the data collection instrument, 
referring to project description variables and is shown in table 6.  This table identifies 
statistically significant differences among the organization effects and questions effects.  
Regarding organization effects, commercial-focused projects and NASA are found to be 
significantly different from government-focused projects.  In looking at question effects, 
questions 4 and 2 are found to be significantly different from each other.  However, an 
interaction effect between organization and question was not discovered in the Project 
Description Variables section when using all 180 participants from the three organization 
types combined. 
 
Table 6. ANOVA Table: Project Description Variables 
Source DF Sum of 
Squares 
Mean Square F Ratio Prob. > F 
Organization 2 10.139 5.0956 5.8984 0.0033 
Question – Project Description 
Variables 
3 2.594 0.864667 2.6303 0.0494 
Organization*Question 6 3.717 0.6195 1.8841 0.0816 
Participant[Organization]&Random 177 152.126 0.859469 2.6142 <.0001 
      
Model 188 168.689 0.897281 2.7292 <.0001 
Error 531 174.576 0.328769   
C. Total 719 343.265    
 
 
The first hypothesis examined if there was a statistically significant organization effect 
among the Project Description Variables questions.  Using an α = 0.05, we reject the null 
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hypothesis and say there are statistically significant organization effects in the Project 
Description Variables section. 
H0: all Organization effects = 0    F = 5.8984 
Ha: at least one Organization effect ≠ 0   P-value = 0.0033 
By rejecting the null hypothesis, a multiple comparison procedure examining the least 
squared means differences using a Tukey Honestly Significant Difference (HSD) was 
conducted, and is illustrated in table 7.  No differences were identified between the 
commercial-focused projects’ organization and NASA.  However the government-
focused projects’ organization is significantly different from both the commercial 
organization and NASA.  This is an interesting result since NASA is a government 
agency and intuition would lead us to think that NASA and government-focused projects 
would not be significantly different from each other, but both might be different from 
commercial-focused projects.  One possible explanation for this result might be due to the 
nature of the projects NASA works on relative to government-focused projects in the 
commercial organization.  For example, NASA often develops projects that are novel in 
the technical field and will never be reproduced, such as the Space Launch System.  
 
Table 7. Tukey HSD: Project Description Variables Organization Effect 
α = 0.05 Q = 2.36365 
Level Letter Least Sq. Mean 
Commercial A  3.48 
NASA A  3.42 
Government  B 3.20 
 
Levels not connected by the same letter are significantly different 
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The next hypothesis examined tested for statistically significant question effects 
among the four questions in the Project Description Variables section.  Using an α = 
0.05, we reject the null hypothesis and say there are statistically significant question 
effects among the Project Description Variables.  However, this p-value is just barely 
under α = 0.05, so extreme differences in this question effect are not anticipated. 
H0: all Question effects = 0     F = 2.6303 
Ha: at least one Question effect ≠ 0    P-value = 0.0494 
A multiple comparison procedure looking at the least squared means differences using 
Tukey HSD is illustrated in table 8 for identifying the differences among questions in the 
Project Description Variables section.  Fewer significant differences were identified here; 
schedule risk and technical risk differ by less than 0.2 using a Tukey HSD.  Therefore at 
this time, we are only able to identify a significant difference between schedule risk and 
technical risk.  It makes sense that schedule risk and technical risk are significantly 
different from each other because they are two very different types of risk.  However, 
they are still related.  Generally, a higher technical risk equates with more schedule risk 
since technically risky projects can be time consuming.  The reason why participants may 
have felt their projects had a higher schedule risk than technical risk is because all 180 
participants in this study are working on complex projects.  Participants are more 
comfortable working through the technical aspects of a project than having to stay on 
schedule.  What this shows, is there continues to be an opportunity for improvement in 
project success relative to schedule.  Each of these four questions appeared to be 
answered in the same manner, which is logical since three out of the four questions were 
asking about the project’s risk. 
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Table 8. Tukey HSD: Project Description Variables Question Effect 
α = 0.05 Q = 2.57723 
Level Letter Least Sq. Mean 
4. Schedule Risk A  3.45 
1. Relevant Scope of Work A B 3.37 
3. Budgetary Risk A B 3.37 
2. Technical Risk  B 3.28 
 
Levels not connected by the same letter are significantly different 
 
The final hypothesis examined for the Project Description Variables section tests 
if there was a statistically significant interaction effect among the organization type and 
questions.  Using an α = 0.05, we fail reject the null hypothesis and say there is not a 
statistically significant interaction effect.  Due to the lack of statistical significance, we 
can conclude there is no need to follow up with a multiple comparison procedure. 
H0: all Organization*Question effects = 0   F = 1.8841 
Ha: at least one Organization*Question effect ≠ 0  P-value = 0.0816 
The Project Description question section produced a low mean square error (0.328769), 
indicating blocking on “Question” was effective and treatment differences were easier to 
detect.  To summarize this section, statistically significant differences were detected 
among organization type and questions, but no statistically significant interaction effect 
between organization type and question was detected. 
 The second ANOVA table corresponds to section 3 of the data collection 
instrument, referring to the Project Success Metrics section and is shown in table 9.  All 
three null hypotheses in the Project Success Metrics section are rejected.  A statistically 
significant organization effect, question effect, and interaction effect are detected.  A 
Tukey HSD will show NASA and commercial organizations to be significantly different 
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from each other in the organizations effect test.  The Tukey HSD for question effects 
indicated questions 8, 2, 9, 1 to not be significantly different from each other, questions 6, 
7, and 4 to not be significantly different from each other, and questions 5 and 3 to not be 
significantly different from each other.  When looking at the interaction effect using the 
Least Squared Means Plot for the Project Success Metrics section, questions 7 – 9 appear 
to trend more inconsistently relative to the other questions for their respective 
organization. 
 
Table 9. ANOVA Table: Project Success Metrics 
Source DF Sum of 
Squares 
Mean 
Square 
F Ratio Prob. > F 
Organization 2 24.987128 12.4936 4.2828 0.0153 
Question – Project Success Metrics 8 81.9556 10.2445 39.6525 <0.0001 
Organization*Question Interaction 16 8.2799 0.517494 2.0030 0.0105 
Participant[Organization]&Random 177 516.3392 2.91717 11.2913 <0.0001 
      
Model 203 644.7175 3.17595 12.2929 <0.0001 
Error 1416 365.8311 0.25836   
C. Total 1619 1010.5486    
 
 
The first hypothesis examined tested if there were any statistically significant 
organization effects among the Project Success Metrics questions.  Using an α = 0.05, we 
reject the null hypothesis and say there are statistically significant organization effects. 
H0: all Organization effects = 0    F = 4.2828 
Ha: at least one Organization effect ≠ 0   P-value = 0.0153 
By rejecting the null hypothesis, a multiple comparison procedure examining the least 
squared means differences using a Tukey HSD was conducted, and is illustrated in table 
10.  No differences were identified between government-focused projects and 
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commercial-focused projects in the commercial organization or between NASA and 
government-focused projects in the commercial organizations.  However, NASA was 
found to be significantly different from commercial-focused projects with regard to 
participant responses to the Project Success Metrics questions. 
 
Table 10. Tukey HSD: Project Success Metrics Organization Effect 
α = 0.05 Q = 2.36365 
Level Letter Least Sq. Mean 
NASA A  3.20 
Government A B 3.06 
Commercial  B 2.91 
 
Levels not connected by the same letter are significantly different 
 
The next two hypotheses examined tested for statistically significant question effects 
among the Project Success Metrics section.  A question effect was first tested in the 
Project Success Metrics section.  Using an α = 0.05, we reject the null hypothesis and say 
there are statistically significant Question effects in the Project Success Metrics section.   
H0: all Question effects = 0     F = 39.6535 
Ha: at least one Question effect ≠ 0    P-value = <0.0001 
A multiple comparison procedure looking at the least squared means differences using a 
Tukey HSD is illustrated in table 11.    Questions 8, 2, 9, and 1 do not have identifiable 
differences from each other.  It is logical that the participants placed the most value on 
these metrics since these four questions are looking at the project from a higher level and 
are validating that the correct project was done correctly.  Questions 6, 7, and 4 are not 
significantly different from each other.  Participants appeared to place less value on 
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budget and schedule relative to similar projects, as well as satisfaction with the project 
management process when determining a project’s success.  Finally, being on budget and 
schedule relative to the original project plan appeared to hold somewhat little value to 
participants when examining metrics from what defines a project’s success.  This is most 
likely due to the well know assumption that projects often go over budget and past 
schedule relative to their initial parameters.  What is more interesting, is that these results 
also show little regard for trying to stay on budget and schedule relative to the original 
project plan by the engineers working on the project.  This suggests either budget and 
schedule need to be more realistically outlined at the beginning of a project’s lifecycle or 
the engineers on these projects need to modify their current strategies to better work to 
meet original budget and schedule guidelines.  A final note on table 11 suggests how the 
organizations cleanly separated the project success metrics into three categories of what 
they value at a high, medium, and low level. 
 
Table 11. Tukey HSD: Project Success Metrics Question Effect 
α = 0.05 Q = 3.10657 
Level Letter Least Sq. Mean  
8. Overall project success (organization view) A   3.32 
2. Technical success relative to similar projects A   3.31 
9. Overall project success (stakeholder view) A   3.30 
1. Technical success relative to initial requirements A   3.26 
6. On budget relative to similar projects  B  3.02 
7. Satisfaction with project management process  B  2.96 
4. On schedule relative to similar projects  B  2.92 
5. On budget relative to original project plan   C 2.74 
3. On schedule relative to original project plan   C 2.71 
 
Levels not connected by the same letter are significantly different 
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The final hypothesis examined for the Project Success Metrics question section 
tested if there was a statistically significant interaction effect between question and 
organization.  Using an α = 0.05, we reject the null hypothesis and say there are 
statistically significant interaction effects.   
H0: all Organization*Question effects = 0   F = 2.0030 
Ha: at least one Organization*Question effect ≠ 0  P-value = 0.0105 
When examining statistically significant interaction effects, we will not follow up with a 
Tukey HSD since a Tukey HSD looks at treatment effects and not interaction.  We want 
to see if organizations are responding to the Project Description Questions in a similar 
fashion.  Therefore we want to look at the Least Squared Means Plot illustrated in figure 
11, where government = 1, commercial = 2, and NASA = 3.  All three organizations 
appear to answer questions 1 – 6 consistently.  Questions 7 – 9 appear to lack consistency 
within question response, especially between organizations 1 and 2, government and 
commercial respectively.  In regard to question 7, looking at if the project management 
process used was effective, NASA appeared to agree that on their projects, the project 
management process used was effective.  Government and commercial project 
organizations appear to slightly disagree.  Furthermore, NASA also felt more strongly 
about their organization and stakeholders viewing their projects as successful versus 
government-focused projects and commercial-focused projects commercial 
organizations. 
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Figure 11. Project Success Metrics Least Squared Means Plot: Interaction Effect 
 
The Project Success Metrics question section produced a low mean square error 
(0.25836), indicating blocking on “question” was effective and treatment differences 
were easier to detect.  To summarize, in the Project Success Metrics section, an 
organization effect, question effect, and interaction effect were all discovered when using 
data from all 180 participants.   A Tukey HSD found NASA and commercial-focused 
projects commercial organization to be significantly different from each other, a second 
Tukey HSD cleanly separated the Project Success Metrics questions into high, medium, 
and low-leveled values, and a Least Squared Means Plot found an interesting interaction 
effect occurring among question 7 – 9.  
 The third ANOVA table corresponds to section 4 of the data collection 
instrument, referring the 17 Systems Engineering Processes section and is shown in table 
12.  Here a statistically significant effect is found among organizations, questions, and the 
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organization and question interaction.  Through the Tukey HSD follow up, NASA is 
significantly different from commercial-focused projects and government-focused 
projects in commercial organizations.  Several significant differences are discovered 
among the 17 Systems Engineering Processes by using a Tukey HSD, and interesting 
discoveries are made looking at the Least Squared Means Plot for detecting interactions. 
 
Table 12. ANOVA Table: Systems Engineering Processes 
Source DF Sum of 
Squares 
Mean 
Square 
F Ratio Prob. > F 
Organization 2 49.600137 24.8001 8.1729 0.0004 
Question – Systems Engineering 
Processes 
16 49.172887 3.7331 10.1124 <0.0001 
Organization*Question Interaction 32 19.110890 0.597215 1.9651 0.0010 
Participant[Organization]&Random 177 537.0984 3.03445 9.9845 <0.0001 
      
Model 227 666.8620 2.93772 9.6662 <0.0001 
Error 2832 860.6880 0.30392   
C. Total 3059 1527.5499    
 
 
The first hypothesis examined if there were any statistically significant organization 
effects among the Systems Engineering Processes section.  Using an α = 0.05, we reject 
the null hypothesis and say there are statistically significant organization effects in the 
Systems Engineering Processes section. 
H0: all Organization effects = 0    F = 8.1729 
Ha: at least one Organization effect ≠ 0   P-value = 0.0004 
By rejecting the null hypothesis, a multiple comparison procedure examining the least 
squared means differences using a Tukey HSD was conducted, and is illustrated in table 
13.   No differences were identified between government and commercial organizations.  
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However, NASA was significantly different from both government and commercial 
organizations.  This difference indicates that NASA places a higher value on the systems 
engineering processes for a project than either commercial-focused projects or 
government-focused projects in commercial organizations do. 
 
Table 13. Tukey HSD: Systems Engineering Processes Organization Effect 
α = 0.05 Q = 2.36365 
Level Letter Least Sq. Mean 
NASA A  3.36 
Commercial  B 3.08 
Government  B 3.07 
 
Levels not connected by the same letter are significantly different 
 
The second hypothesis examined tested for statistically significant question 
effects in the Systems Engineering Processes section. Using an α = 0.05, we reject the 
null hypothesis and say there are statistically significant question effects in the Systems 
Engineering Processes section. 
H0: all Question effects = 0     F = 10.1124 
Ha: at least one Question effect ≠ 0    P-value = <0.0001 
Table 14 follows up with a multiple comparison procedure looking at the Least Squared 
Means Differences using Tukey HSD.  Participants most strongly agreed processes: 7, 5, 
8, 4, 9, 15, 6, and 14 were completed.  These processes were not significantly different 
from each other.  This might mean at NASA, for example, the duties associated with 
these processes should fall to the same branch chief if the project is small or a set of 
branch chiefs who are able to closely work together if the project is large.  Processes: 7, 
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5, 8, 4, 9, 15, 6, and 14 were significantly different from processes: 11, 1, 13, 2, 16, and 
10, as well as processes: 13, 2, 16, 10, 17, and 3.  Participants appeared to feel processes: 
13, 2, 16, 10, 17, and 3 were completed with less emphasis than other processes. 
 
Table 14. Tukey HSD: Systems Engineering Processes Question Effect 
α = 0.05 Q = 3.46162 
Level Letter Least Sq. Mean 
7.   Product Verification A       3.41 
5.   Product Implementation A B     3.29 
8.   Production Validation A B     3.29 
4.   Design Solution A B     3.28 
9.   Product Transition A B C   3.26 
15. Technical Data Management A B C   3.25 
6.   Product Integration A B C   3.24 
14. Configuration Management A B C     3.23 
12. Interface Management   B C     3.19 
11. Requirements Management   B C D   3.16 
1.   Stakeholder Expectations Definition   B C D   3.16 
13. Technical Risk Management   B C D E 3.10 
2.   Technical Requirements Definition   B C D E 3.09 
16. Technical Assessment   C D E 3.07 
10. Technical Planning     D E 2.97 
17. Decision Analysis       E 2.94 
3.   Logical Decomposition       E 2.93 
 
Levels not connected by the same letter are significantly different 
 
The final hypothesis examined for the Systems Engineering Processes question 
section tested for statistically significant interaction effect among questions and 
organization types.  Using an α = 0.05, we reject the null hypothesis and say there are 
statistically significant interaction effects.  Again, to see if organizations are responding 
to the Systems Engineering Processes Questions in a similar fashion, we look at the 
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Lease Squared Means Plot in figure 13, where government = 1, commercial = 2, and 
NASA = 3. 
H0: all Organization*Question effects = 0   F = 1.9651 
Ha: at least one Organization*Question effect ≠ 0  P-value = 0.0010 
 
 
Figure 12. Systems Engineering Processes Least Squared Means Plot: Interaction 
Effect 
 
The Systems Engineering Processes question section produced a low mean square error 
(0.30392), indicating blocking on “question” was effective and treatment differences 
were easy to detect.  In figure 12, NASA engineers rated themselves as generally, more 
successful at completing the 17 systems engineering processes than commercial-focused 
projects and government-focused projects in commercial organizations do.  However, 
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overall trends appeared as well.  All three organizations felt least confident in processes 
3, 10, and 17, logical decomposition, technical planning, and decision analysis, 
respectively.  Processes 4 and 7, design solution definition and product verification 
respectively seemed to generally receive the highest ratings from the three organizations.  
Finally, figure 13 showed NASA to be most consistent in how they approached the 17 
systems engineering processes.  Government (1) and commercial (2) organizations’ 
projects appeared to have quite a bit of variability in how they approach the systems 
engineering processes.  Organization 2, the commercial organization, showed some 
notable peaks and valleys in the processes they feel they do well at and do not do well at.  
This might be due to the variety of commercial-focused projects being done.  
Government-focused commercial organization projects (1) also had some notable peaks 
and valleys across the processes as well, but not as many as commercial-focused projects 
in commercial organizations (2).  This is most likely due to projects needing to be more 
standardized with government projects where commercial-focused projects are more able 
to choose which processes to place emphasis on when conducting their projects. 
 To summarize, significant differences were detected among organization effect, 
question effect, and organization and question interaction effect in the Systems 
Engineering Processes section when using data from all 180 participants from the three 
organization types.  Regarding the organization effect, a Tukey HSD found NASA to be 
significantly different from commercial and government organizations. Multiple 
observations were made using the Tukey HSD for question effect and the Least Squared 
Means Plot for interaction effect.  Table 15 summarizes all hypotheses tested in this 
section. 
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Table 15. ANOVA Summary Testing All 180 Participants 
Section Hypothesis P-value F Ratio 
Project Description 
Variables 
H0: all Organization effects = 0 
Ha: at least one Organization effect ≠ 0 
0.0033 5.8984 
Project Description 
Variables 
H0: all Question effects = 0  
Ha: at least one Question effect ≠ 0  
0.0494 2.6303 
Project Description 
Variables 
H0: all Organization*Question effects = 0  
Ha: at least one Organization*Question effect ≠ 0  
0.0816 1.8841 
Project Success 
Metrics 
H0: all Organization effects = 0  
Ha: at least one Organization effect ≠ 0  
0.0153 4.2828 
Project Success 
Metrics 
H0: all Question effects = 0   
Ha: at least one Question effect ≠ 0  
<0.0001 39.6535 
Project Success 
Metrics 
H0: all Organization*Question effects = 0  
Ha: at least one Organization*Question effect ≠ 0  
0.0105 2.0030 
Systems 
Engineering 
Processes 
H0: all Organization effects = 0   
Ha: at least one Organization effect ≠ 0 
0.0004 8.1729 
Systems 
Engineering 
Processes 
H0: all Question effects = 0   
Ha: at least one Question effect ≠ 0  
<0.0001 10.1124 
Systems 
Engineering 
Processes 
H0: all Organization*Question effects = 0  
Ha: at least one Organization*Question effect ≠ 0  
 
0.0010 1.9651 
 
 
3. ANOVA tables testing government, commercial, and NASA separately 
 The third section of the data analysis uses one-way ANOVA tables to identify 
questions differences at an individual organization level.  The three organizations are 
government-contracted projects, commercial-contracted projects, and NASA projects.  
The ANOVA tables used sections 2, 3, 4, and 6, Project Description Variables, Project 
Success Metrics, Systems Engineering Processes, and Non-Technical Variables, 
respectively from the data collection instrument.  Each ANOVA table only contains the 
participants from each respective organization being tested.  The government-focused 
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projects’ organization contains 46 participants, the commercial-focused projects’ 
organization contains 83 participants, and NASA contains 51 participants. 
 The first set of ANOVA tables corresponds to section 2 of the data collection 
instrument, referring to Project Description Variables.  In this set of ANOVA tables, we 
will see statistically significant differences were not detected within government-focused 
projects or NASA projects, but statistically significant differences were detected in 
commercial-focused projects.   
The first hypothesis tests for government-contracted projects’ question effects in 
the Project Description Variables section and refers to table 16.   
 
Table 16. ANOVA Table: Government-Focused Projects – Project Description 
Variables 
 
Source DF Sum of 
Squares 
Mean 
Square 
F Ratio Prob. > F 
Question – Project Description 
Variables 
3 3.21739 1.07246 2.6190 0.0535 
Participants - Government 45 40.4565 0.89903 2.1954 0.0003 
      
Model 48 43.673913 0.909873 2.2219 0.0002 
Error 135 55.282609 0.409501   
C. Total 183 98.956522    
 
 
The hypothesis tests whether there are any statistically significant question effects among 
the four questions in the Project Description Variables section.  Using an α = 0.05, we 
fail to reject the null hypothesis and say there are not any statistically significant question 
effects among the questions in the Project Description Variables section for government-
contracted projects. 
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H0: all Question effects = 0    F = 2.6190 
Ha: at least one Question effect ≠ 0   P-value = 0.0535 
Due to the lack of support for any significant differences, a Tukey HSD is not necessary 
for seeking additional information on question effects for this test.  The Project 
Description Variables question section produced a low mean square error (0.409501), 
indicating blocking on “question” was effective and treatment differences were easy to 
detect for the government-focused projects in commercial organizations. 
 The second hypothesis tests for statistically significant question effects among the 
Project Description Variables section for the commercial-focused projects’ organization.  
The ANOVA table shown in table 17 is used to test the question effects hypothesis. 
 
Table 17. ANOVA Table: Commercial-Focused Projects Project Description 
Variables 
 
Source DF Sum of 
Squares 
Mean 
Square 
F Ratio Prob. > F 
Question – Project Description 
Variables 
3 2.80422 0.93474 2.8944 0.0359 
Participants - Commercial 82 62.6747 0.76433 2.3667 <0.0001 
      
Model 85 65.47892 0.770340 2.853 <0.0001 
Error 246 79.44578 0.322950   
C. Total 331 144.92470    
 
 
By using an α = 0.05, we reject the null hypothesis and say there are statistically 
significant differences among the four Project Description Variables questions for the 
commercial-contracted questions. 
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H0: all Question effects = 0    F = 2.8944 
Ha: at least one Question effect ≠ 0   P-value = 0.0359 
A multiple comparisons procedure looking at the least squared means differences is then 
conducted using a Tukey HSD and shown in table 18.  
 
Table 18. Tukey HSD: Commercial-Focused Projects – Project Description 
Variables Question Effect 
 
∝ = 0.50 Q = 2.5867 
Level Letter Least Sq. Mean 
4. Schedule Risk A  3.59 
3. Budgetary Risk A B 3.55 
2. Technical Risk A B 3.43 
1. Relevant Scope of Work  B 3.36 
 
Levels not connected by the same letter are significantly different 
 
 Questions 4 and 1 are the only questions that can be identified as significantly different 
from each other.  However, these results differ from the results in table 8, looking at 
Project Description Variables question effects among all 180 institutions.  In table 8, 
questions 4 and 2 were significantly different from each other, with question 2 receiving 
the lowest value.  However, at the organizational level, for commercial-focused projects, 
relevant scope of work is least important.  The Project Description Variables question 
section produced a low mean square error (0.322950) indicating blocking on “Question” 
was effective and treatment differences were easy to detect for the commercial-focused 
projects in commercial organizations. 
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 The final hypothesis examined for the Project Description Variables section tests 
whether there are any statistically significant question effects among NASA projects in 
the Project Description Variables section.  Table 19 illustrates the results from the NASA 
projects for the Project Description Variables section. 
 
Table 19. ANOVA Table: NASA Project Description Variables 
Source DF Sum of 
Squares 
Mean 
Square 
F Ratio Prob. > F 
Question – Project Description 
Variables 
3 0.40196 0.13399 0.5044 0.6798 
Participants - NASA 50 48.9951 0.9799 3.6886 <0.0001 
      
Model 53 49.397059 0.932020 3.5084 <0.0001 
Error 150 39.848039 0.265654   
C. Total 203 89.245098    
 
 
Using an α = 0.05, we fail to reject the null hypothesis and say there are no statistically 
significant differences among the four Project Description Variables question for NASA 
projects. 
H0: all Question effects = 0    F = 0.5044 
Ha: at least one Question effect ≠ 0   P-value = 0.6798 
This indicates that the NASA engineers who participated in the study answered all four 
questions in the Project Description Variables questions in a similar manner.  Therefore, 
due to the lack of support for any significant differences, a Tukey HSD is not necessary 
for seeking additional information on question effects for this test.  The Project 
Description Variables question section produced a low mean square error (0.265654) 
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indicating blocking on “question” was effective and treatment differences were easy to 
detect for the NASA Agency organization. 
 To summarize the findings from the Project Description Variables section testing 
for statistically significant differences among organization question effects, statistically 
significant differences were detected among the questions in the commercial-focused 
projects but not the government-focused projects or NASA projects.  A Tukey HSD was 
used to identify the least squared means differences among the questions for the 
commercial-focused projects, and questions 4 and 1 were identified as significantly 
different. 
 The second set of tables are used to test for statistically significant question 
effects for the Project Success Metrics section at an organization level.  In this set of 
ANOVA tables, we will see statistically significant differences were detected within 
government-focused projects, commercial-focused projects, and NASA projects.  
The first ANOVA table testing for statistically significant question effects in the 
Project Success Metrics section looks at government-focused projects and is seen in table 
20. 
 
Table 20. ANOVA Table: Government-Focused Projects – Project Success Metrics 
Source DF Sum of 
Squares 
Mean 
Square 
F Ratio Prob. > F 
Question – Project Success 
Metrics 
8 21.5411 2.69263 10.1428 <0.0001 
Participants - Government 45 105.256 2.33902 8.8108 <0.0001 
      
Model 53 126.79710 2.39240 9.0119 <0.0001 
Error 360 95.57005 0.36547   
C. Total 413 222.36715    
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Using an α = 0.05, we reject the null hypothesis and say there are statistically significant 
differences among the nine questions in the Project Success Metrics section for 
government-focused projects. 
H0: all Question effects = 0    F = 10.1428 
Ha: at least one Question effect ≠ 0   P-value = <0.0001 
A multiple comparison procedure looking at the least squared means differences using a 
Tukey HSD is illustrated in table 21.   
 
Table 21. Tukey HSD: Government-Focused Projects Project Success Metrics 
Question Effect 
 
 ∝ = 0.50  Q = 3.12078 
Level Letter Least Sq. Mean 
2. Technical success relative to similar projects A   3.33 
1. Technical success relative to initial requirements A   3.26 
9. Overall project success (stakeholder view) A B  3.24 
8. Overall project success (organization view) A B  3.24 
6. On budget relative to similar projects A B C 3.04 
4. On schedule relative to similar projects  B C 2.94 
5. On budget relative to original project plan   C 2.85 
7. Satisfaction with project management process   C 2.80 
3. On schedule relative to original project plan   C 2.74 
 
Levels not connected by the same letter are significantly different 
 
Immediately, we see that table 21 does not identify significant differences as definitively 
as table 11 did when all 180 organizations were tested.  In table 21, questions 2, 1, 9, and 
8 are significantly different from questions 4, 5, 7, and 3.  The significant differences 
among questions are still quite similar to the significant differences identified for all 180 
institutions in table 11.  However, the results in table 21 are not as conclusive.  The most 
notable takeaway is the similarity between table 11 and table 21.  At an overall level, 
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table 11 showed us how little value participants place on budget and schedule relative to 
the original project plan regardless of the organization type.  What is most important is 
overall project success and overall technical success.  Engineers working on government-
focused projects see value in the project being completed correctly relative to the 
technical requirements, and these values translate across other organization types.  The 
Project Success Metrics question section produced a low mean square error (0.36547) 
indicating blocking on “question” was effective and treatment differences were easy to 
detect for the government-focused projects in commercial organizations. 
 The second ANOVA table in tests whether there is any statistically significant 
differences among the nine questions in the Project Success Metrics section for 
commercial-contracted projects.  Table 22 illustrates these results. 
 
Table 22. ANOVA Table: Commercial-Focused Projects – Project Success Metrics 
Source DF Sum of 
Squares 
Mean 
Square 
F Ratio Prob. > F 
Question – Project Success 
Metrics 
8 62.7738 7.84672 26.3966 <0.0001 
Participants - Commercial 82 257.213 3.13674 10.5521 <0.0001 
      
Model 90 319.98661 3.55541 11.9605 <0.0001 
Error 656 195.00402 0.29726   
C. Total 746 514.99063    
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Using an α = 0.05, we reject the null hypothesis and say there are statistically significant 
differences among question effects for the commercial-focused projects in the Project 
Success Metrics section. 
H0: all Question effects = 0    F = 26.3966 
Ha: at least one Question effect ≠ 0   P-value = <0.0001 
To identify which questions are significantly different from each other, a multiple 
comparisons procedure looking at the least squared means differences using Tukey HSD 
was conducted and is shown in table 23.   
 
Table 23. Tukey HSD: Commercial-Focused Projects Project Success Metrics 
Question Effect 
 
∝ = 0.50 Q = 3.11217 
Level Letter Least Sq. Mean 
8. Overall project success (organization view) A     3.27 
9. Overall project success (stakeholder view) A     3.22 
2. Technical success relative to similar projects A B    3.16 
1. Technical success relative to initial requirements A B C   3.08 
6. On budget relative to similar projects  B C D  2.94 
7. Satisfaction with project management process   C D  2.86 
4. On schedule relative to similar projects    D  2.77 
3. On schedule relative to original project plan     E 2.48 
5. On budget relative to original project plan     E 2.42 
 
Levels not connected by the same letter are significantly different 
 
 
Table 23 provides a great deal of information, however we will discuss the more notable 
differences.  Questions 8, 9, 2, and 1 were ranked highest, as were they in table 11 when 
looking at question effects from all 180 participants.   Also in table 23 and table 11, 
questions 8, 9, 2, and 1 were significantly different from questions 3 and 5.  These results 
are again consistent with the discoveries found in table 11 looking at the Project Success 
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Metrics Question Effect among all organizations and table 21, which looked at the 
Project Success Metrics Question Effect in government-focused projects.  One 
particularly interesting finding in table 23 that was not as clear in table 21 is that 
commercial-focused projects tend to rank project success metrics in high, medium, and 
low levels, just like what was seen in table 11 and in generally the same order. This 
indicates that commercial-focused projects are most interested in completing the project 
rather than following a strict process of rules.  The Project Success Metrics question 
section produced a low mean square error (0.29726) indicating blocking on “question” 
was effective and treatment differences were easy to detect for the commercial-focused 
projects in commercial organizations. 
The final ANOVA table tests for question effects in the Project Success Metrics 
section is for NASA projects and is illustrated in table 24. 
 
Table 24. ANOVA Table: NASA Project Success Metrics 
 
Source DF Sum of 
Squares 
Mean 
Square 
F Ratio Prob. > F 
Question – Project Success 
Metrics 
8 19.0763 2.38453 12.6741 <0.0001 
Participants - NASA 50 153.87 3.07741 16.3568 <0.0001 
      
Model 58 172.94662 2.98184 15.8488 <0.0001 
Error 400 75.25708 0.18814   
C. Total 458 248.20370    
 
 
Using an α = 0.05, we reject the null hypothesis and say there are significant differences 
among the nine questions in the Project Success Metrics section for NASA projects. 
H0: all Question effects = 0    F = 12.6741 
Ha: at least one Question effect ≠ 0   P-value = <0.0001 
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Table 25 follows up with a Tukey HSD multiple comparison procedure to look at the 
least squared means differences.   
 
Table 25. Tukey HSD: NASA Project Success Metrics Question Effects 
∝ = 0.50 Q = 3.11887 
Level Letter Least Sq. Mean 
8. Overall project success (organization view) A   3.45 
2. Technical success relative to similar projects A   3.41 
9. Overall project success (stakeholder view) A   3.41 
1. Technical success relative to initial requirements A   3.37 
7. Satisfaction with project management process A B  3.22 
6. On budget relative to similar projects  B C 3.08 
4. On schedule relative to similar projects  B C 3.04 
5. On budget relative to original project plan  B C 2.95 
3. On schedule relative to original project plan   C 2.90 
 
Levels not connected by the same letter are significantly different 
 
 
Questions 8, 2, 9, 1, and 7 are significantly different from questions 6, 4, 5, and 3.  These 
results are consistent with the discoveries made in the commercial-focused projects 
Tukey HSD table, government-focused projects Tukey HSD table, and overall Tukey 
HSD in table 11.  This shows that to NASA, as well as in other organizations, ensuring a 
project’s completion is much more important than maintaining the project’s original 
budget or schedule.  We might have expected NASA to value the Project Success Metrics 
differently than government-focused and commercial-focused commercial organizations, 
but this was not the case.  Despite NASA being a government agency working on unique 
projects, their motives for project success align almost exactly with commercial 
organization.  The Project Success Metrics question section produced a low mean square 
error (0.18814) indicating blocking on “question” was effective and treatment differences 
were easy to detect for the NASA Agency Organization. 
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Overall, the Project Success Metrics section provided fairly consistent results 
among organization types.  Statistically significant question effects were discovered 
among government-focused commercial projects, commercial-focused commercial 
projects, and NASA projects.  Furthermore, when following up with a Tukey HSD, 
overall project success and technical success were most important to all organizations 
while budget and schedule relative to the original project plan were least important.  We 
are also able to conclude that table 11’s results were representative of not only the study 
overall, but also representative of the organizations at an individual level. 
 The third set of ANOVA tables test whether statistically significant question 
effects exist in the Systems Engineering Processes section for government-focused 
projects, commercial-focused projects, and NASA projects.  What we will find out in this 
section is there are statistically significant question effects among government-focused 
projects, commercial-focused project but not NASA projects. 
 Table 26 is the first ANOVA table in the Systems Engineering Processes section 
to test for statistically significant question effects among government-focused projects. 
 
Table 26. ANOVA Table: Government-Focused Projects Systems Engineering 
Processes 
 
Source DF Sum of 
Squares 
Mean 
Square 
F Ratio Prob. > F 
Question – Systems Engineering 
Processes 
16 18.5448 1.15905 3.5384 <0.0001 
Participants - Government 45 194.073 4.31273 13.1289 <0.0001 
      
Model 61 212.61765 3.48554 10.6107 <0.0001 
Error 720 236.51407 0.32849   
C. Total 781 449.13171    
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Using an α = 0.05, we reject the null hypothesis and say there are significant differences 
among the 17 Systems Engineering Processes for government-contracted projects. 
H0: all Question effects = 0    F = 3.5384 
Ha: at least one Question effect ≠ 0   P-value = <0.0001 
Using a Tukey HSD, table 27 follows up with a multiple comparisons procedure looking 
at the Least Squared Means Differences.   
 
Table 27. Tukey HSD: Government-Focused Projects Systems Engineering 
Processes Question Effects 
 
∝ = 0.50 Q = 3.47101 
Level Letter Least Sq. Mean 
4. Design Solution A  3.30 
7. Product Verification A  3.28 
5. Product Implementation A  3.26 
15. Technical Data Management A B 3.20 
9. Product Transition A B 3.17 
14. Configuration Management A B 3.17 
12. Interface Management A B 3.15 
8. Product Validation A B 3.10 
6. Product Integration A B 3.09 
11. Requirements Management A B 3.09 
1. Stakeholder Expectations Definition A B 3.07 
16. Technical Assessment A B 2.98 
2. Technical Requirements Definition A B 2.89 
13. Technical Risk Management A B 2.89 
3. Logical Decomposition  B 2.85 
10. Technical Planning  B 2.85 
17. Decision Analysis  B 2.85 
 
Levels not connected by the same letter are significantly different 
 
Table 27 shows processes 4, 7, and 5 to be significantly different from processes 3, 10, 
and 17.  This means in government-focused projects, engineers feel design solution, 
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product verification, and product implementation are more important than logical 
decomposition, technical planning, and decision analysis.  These results are interesting, 
but it is unclear as to why processes 4, 7, and 5 are significantly more important in 
government-focused commercial projects than processes 3, 10, and 17.  However, table 
14 showed these same significant differences when testing all 180 participants from the 
three organizations types in this study.  The Systems Engineering Processes question 
section produced a low mean square error (0.32849) indicating blocking on “question” 
was effective and treatment differences were easy to detect for the government-focused 
projects in the commercial organization. 
Table 28 is the second ANOVA table in this set to test for statistically significant 
differences among question effects in the Systems Engineering Processes section for 
commercial-focused projects.   
 
Table 28. ANOVA Table: Commercial-Focused Projects Systems Engineering 
Processes 
 
Source DF Sum of 
Squares 
Mean 
Square 
F Ratio Prob. > F 
Question – Systems Engineering 
Processes 
16 56.9426 3.55891 10.2689 <0.0001 
Participants - Commercial 82 260.621 3.1783 9.1706 <0.0001 
      
Model 98 317.56343 3.24044 9.3499 <0.0001 
Error 1312 454.70446 0.34657   
C. Total 1410 772.26790    
 
 
Using an α = 0.05, we reject the null hypothesis and say there are statistically significant 
differences among the 17 Systems Engineering Processes for government-focused 
projects. 
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H0: all Question effects = 0    F = 10.2689 
Ha: at least one Question effect ≠ 0   P-value = <0.0001 
To identify where those significant differences are located, a multiple comparison 
procedure looking at the Least Squared Means Differences using a Tukey HSD was 
conducted and provided in table 29.   
 
Table 29. Tukey HSD: Commercial-Focused Projects – Systems Engineering 
Processes Question Effects 
 
∝ = 0.50 Q = 3.46533 
Level Letter Least Sq. Mean 
7. Product Verification A       3.46 
8. Product Validation A B      3.40 
9. Product Transition A B C     3.25 
5. Product Implementation A B C     3.22 
6. Product Integration A B C     3.22 
15. Technical Data Management A B C D    3.17 
14. Configuration Management A B C D    3.17 
13. Technical Risk Management  B C D E   3.11 
1. Stakeholder Expectations Definition   C D E F  3.06 
4. Design Solution   C D E F  3.06 
2. Technical Requirements Definition   C D E F  3.04 
12. Interface Management   C D E F  3.02 
11. Requirements Management   C D E F G 3.01 
16. Technical Assessment    D E F G 2.89 
10. Technical Planning     E F G 2.80 
17. Decision Analysis      F G 2.78 
3. Logical Decomposition       G 2.70 
 
Levels not connected by the same letter are significantly different 
 
 
The more notable observations from the table show processes 7, 8, 9, 5, 6, 15, and 14 are 
significantly different from processes 1, 4, 2, 12, 11, 16, 10 and 17.  Processes 7, 8, 9, 5, 
6, 15, and 14 are also significantly different from processes 11, 16, 10, 17, and 3.  These 
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results are unique from the results found in table 11 and table 27, which looked at the 
question effect from all three-organization types and government-focused commercial 
organizations, respectively.  In table 29, we see commercial-focused projects appear to 
focus on the product driven processes rather than the overall project driven processes.  
This is interesting; since table 23 showed commercial-focused projects tend to focus on 
overall project success when evaluating their project success metrics.  But, when 
engineers are looking at the actual processes, product processes are significantly more 
important than the other processes.  The Systems Engineering Processes question section 
produced a low mean square error (0.34657) indicating blocking on “question” was 
effective and treatment differences were easy to detect for the commercial-focused 
projects in the commercial organization. 
 Table 30 is the final ANOVA table in this set and tests for statistically significant 
question effects in the Systems Engineering Processes section for NASA projects. 
 
Table 30. ANOVA Table: NASA Projects – Systems Engineering Processes 
Source DF Sum of 
Squares 
Mean 
Square 
F Ratio Prob. > F 
Question – Systems Engineering 
Processes 
16 4.67762 0.29235 1.3801 0.1441 
Participants - NASA 50 82.4031 1.64806 7.7799 <0.0001 
      
Model 66 87.08074 1.31941 6.2284 <0.0001 
Error 800 169.46943 0.21184   
C. Total 866 256.55017    
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Using an α = 0.05, we fail to reject the null hypothesis and say there are no significant 
differences among the 17 Systems Engineering Processes for NASA projects. 
H0: all Question effects = 0    F = 1.3801 
Ha: at least one Question effect ≠ 0   P-value = 0.1441 
Due to the lack of significant differences, we will not follow up with a Tukey HSD.  
However, failing to reject the null hypothesis tested is telling.  What this test showed is 
NASA systems engineers find all 17 systems engineering processes to be very important 
and incremental in a project’s lifecycle.  This test indicates that in the case of NASA, the 
17 Systems Engineering Processes cannot be ranked based on importance or level of 
emphasis.  All processes must be completed with excellence.  The Systems Engineering 
Processes question section produced a low mean square error (0.21184) indicating 
blocking on “question” was effective and treatment differences were easy to detect for 
the NASA Agency organization. 
 Overall, statistically significant question effects were discovered in the Systems 
Engineering Processes section for government-focused commercial projects and 
commercial-focused commercial projects, but not for NASA projects.  A Tukey HSD 
discovered the government-focused projects to rank the significantly different systems 
engineering processes in a similar manner to the overall systems engineering processes 
question effect Tukey HSD when testing all 180 participants, but this was not the case 
with commercial-focused projects. 
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The final ANOVA table in this paper was calculated from the modified data 
collection instrument.  Table 31 tests for significant differences in the Non-Technical 
Variables section for NASA projects.   
 
Table 31. ANOVA Table: NASA Projects’ Non-Technical Variables 
Source DF Sum of 
Squares 
Mean 
Square 
F Ratio Prob. > F 
Question – Non-Technical 
Variables 
10 127.97979 12.798 29.1983 <0.0001 
Participants - NASA 50 63.84263 1.37685 2.9131 <0.0001 
      
Model 60 191.81490 3.19692 7.2937 <0.0001 
Error 500 219.15658 0.43831   
C. Total 560 410.97148    
 
 
Using an α = 0.05, we reject the null hypothesis and say there are statistically significant 
differences among the 11 questions tested in the Non-Technical Variables section of the 
modified data collection instrument for NASA projects.  
H0: all Question effects = 0    F = 29.1983 
Ha: at least one Question effect ≠ 0   P-value = <0.0001 
A Tukey HSD was used as our multiple comparison procedure for looking at Least 
Squared Means Differences and is illustrated in table 32.    
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Table 32. Tukey HSD: NASA Projects’ Non-Technical Variables 
∝ = 0.50 Q = 3.23371 
Level Letter Least Sq. Mean 
3. Professional Investment A     3.63 
4. Personal Investment A     3.50 
8. Team Experience A     3.45 
1. Familiarity in Project Details A     3.44 
9. Level of Testing A B    3.26 
12. Degree of Formulation Study  B C   2.99 
13. New Design Factor  B C   2.97 
10. Development Duration  B C   2.94 
11. Number of Organizations   C D  2.64 
6. Budget Constraint    D E 2.31 
7. Volatility of Requirements     E 2.11 
 
Levels not connected by the same letter are significantly different 
 
 
Regarding the notable observations, questions 3, 4, 8, 1, and 9 were significantly different 
from questions 12, 13, 10, and 11, as well as questions 3, 4, 8, 1, and 9 were significantly 
different from questions 6 and 7.  Table 32 indicates which non-technical variables or 
engineering management skills might be important in a project and be recognized when 
forming a project’s core set of engineers.  Budget constraints and volatility of 
requirements are virtually unimportant in comparison to an engineer’s professional and 
personal investment in the project, the team’s experience, familiarity in the project’s 
details, and the level of testing the project undergoes.  Furthermore, the results suggest 
degree of formulation study, new design factor, development duration, and number of 
organizations should be secondary considerations as well.   
 When comparing table 32 to table 14, which uses a Tukey HSD to identify 
significant differences among NASA’s 17 systems engineering processes for all 180 
participants, notable observations were also identified.  For example personal investment, 
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professional investment, team experience, and familiarity in project details at NASA all 
had higher least squared mean values than any of the systems engineering processes’ 
least squared mean values when all 180 participants were analyzed together.  This result 
could be indicating that the current design of NASA’s 17 systems engineering processes 
might not be correctly capturing the inputs that most impact project success.  At NASA, 
leading indicators for project success might actually stem from personal investment, 
professional investment, team experience, and familiarity in project details.  Due to these 
results, further analysis of how non-technical variables impact government-focused 
projects in commercial organizations and commercial-focused projects in commercial 
organizations could benefit project success.  If similar results to what was discovered in 
tables 31 and 32 are discovered for the commercial sector, then further analysis to how 
systems engineering is conducted within government agencies and commercial agencies, 
as well as across government and commercial agencies should be examined. 
 In addition to the findings discussed above, the interviews also indicated that 
systems engineers at NASA value practical tools that show them how to directly apply 
systems engineering requirements and procedures (NASA, 2014).  However, currently 
there are only general tools that exist to help systems engineers and practitioners at 
NASA navigate through the 2007 handbook (Jansma, 2008).  It has also been recognized 
that NASA has been faced with a unique challenge in technology, organization, and 
culture for finding an Agency-specific project management framework that can 
distinguish itself among different types of projects (Shenhar, et al., 2005).  One proposed 
tool has been to adapt the “Novelty, Complexity, Technology, Pace ‘Diamond’ Model” to 
NASA.  In an attempt to help develop NASA’s systems engineers, programs like the 
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Systems Engineering Leadership Development Program (SELDP) have been created 
(Williams & Reyes, 2012).  The goal is to identify, train, and develop the entire learning 
systems and not just the program participants so that a greater contribution can be made 
to the organization.  Despite the practical tools that do currently exist at NASA to help 
systems engineers and engineering practitioners, more are wanted.  Table 33 summarizes 
the hypotheses tested in this section. 
 
Table 33. Summary of Question Effects Within an Organization 
 
Section 
 
Organization Hypothesis P-value F Ratio 
Project 
Description 
Variables 
Government-
Focused Projects 
H0: all Question effects = 0 
Ha: at least one Question effect ≠ 0 
0.0535 2.6190 
Project 
Description 
Variables 
Commercial-
Focused Projects 
H0: all Question effects = 0  
Ha: at least one Question effect ≠ 0  
0.0359 2.8944 
Project 
Description 
Variables 
NASA H0: all Question effects = 0  
Ha: at least one Question effect ≠ 0  
0.6798 0.5044 
Project Success 
Metrics 
Government-
Focused Projects 
H0: all Question effects = 0  
Ha: at least one Question effect ≠ 0 
<0.0001 10.1428 
Project Success 
Metrics 
Commercial-
Focused Projects 
H0: all Question effects = 0   
Ha: at least one Question effect ≠ 0  
<0.0001 26.3966 
Project Success 
Metrics 
NASA H0: all Question effects = 0  
Ha: at least one Question effect ≠ 0 
<0.0001 12.6741 
Systems 
Engineering 
Processes 
Government-
Focused Projects 
H0: all Question effects = 0  
Ha: at least one Question effect ≠ 0 
<0.0001 3.5384 
Systems 
Engineering 
Processes 
Commercial-
Focused Projects 
H0: all Question effects = 0   
Ha: at least one Question effect ≠ 0
  
<0.0001 10.2689 
Systems 
Engineering 
Processes 
NASA H0: all Question effects = 0  
Ha: at least one Question effect ≠ 0  
0.1441 1.3801 
Non-Technical 
Variables 
NASA H0: all Question effects = 0  
Ha: at least one Question effect ≠ 0 
<0.0001 29.1983 
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Conclusion 
 This paper identified variations in how the systems engineering process is applied 
to complex projects and how project success is impacted by organization type.  The 
organizations, included in this study, were commercial organizations working on 
government projects, commercial organizations working on commercial projects, and 
NASA.  NASA was the focal point of the study.  This research area is of interest because 
NASA must run its large-scale and complex projects on an increasingly limited budget.  
Therefore, effective implementation of systems engineering techniques is crucial.  The 
results from this study will contribute to the design for the forthcoming NASA’s systems 
engineering practitioners guide. 
 The overall study consisted of three phases: the 2007 MSFC flight hardware 
study, the 2013 government and commercial organizations study, and the 2014 NASA 
Agency study, which was the focus of this paper.  Data for the 2014 NASA study was 
collected using a modified version of the data collection instrument that was originally 
designed for the 2013 study.  Modifications to the data collection instrument, included 
the addition of a section that captured the influence of non-technical variables.  Fifty-one 
NASA engineers participated in the 2014 study and were representative of all 10 NASA 
Centers, as well as Headquarters.  The 2013 study included 129 participants. 
 To gather information on the impact the systems engineering processes have with 
the project success metrics, matrices were used and calculations were correlated.  Notable 
observations were discovered using the matrices.  For example, almost twice as many 
meaningful correlations were produced for the 2014 NASA study than for the 2013 
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government and commercial organizations study.  A matrix was also developed to 
identify meaningful correlations among non-technical variables and the project success 
metrics for the 2014 NASA study. 
 Next, three one-way ANOVA tables were constructed to identify similarities and 
differences among organizations with respect to project description variables, project 
success metrics, and the systems engineering processes.  In terms of the project 
description variables, commercial organizations and NASA engineers were both found to 
be significantly different from government organizations, but not from each other.  
However, with regard to project success metrics, no significant difference was found 
between government and commercial organizations or between commercial organizations 
and NASA engineers, but commercial organizations and NASA engineers were 
determined to be significantly different.  Finally, with respect to systems engineering 
processes, no significant difference was found between government and commercial 
organizations, but both were significantly different from NASA engineers. 
Finally, 10 additional one-way ANOVA tables were constructed to identify 
similarities and differences among the modified data collection instrument’s questions 
based on organization, with respect to project description variables, project success 
metrics, systems engineering processes, and non-technical variables.  Regarding the 
project description variables, statistically significant differences were detected in the data 
for commercial-focused projects in commercial organizations, but no statistically 
significant differences were discovered within government-focused projects in 
commercial organizations or NASA.  When testing for questions effects among project 
success metrics, statistically significant differences were detected within government-
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focused projects in commercial organizations, commercial-focused projects in 
commercial organizations, and in NASA projects.  No statistically significant differences 
were detected in NASA projects among the systems engineering processes, but 
significant differences were detected within government-focused projects in commercial 
organizations and within commercial-focused projects in commercial organizations.  The 
final ANOVA table tested for statistically significant question effects among non-
technical variables within NASA projects.  This test indicated statistically significant 
differences among non-technical variables within NASA projects. 
 Based on the outcomes from the analysis of the survey data, it is apparent that 
additional data will be needed to more fully explore the similarities and more importantly 
the differences among the significant correlations.  The one-way ANOVA table 
displaying results for the systems engineering processes section showed the organization 
and question interaction effects to have produced results that should be followed up on 
(see table 14 and figure 12). 
 Future research includes three studies that would serve as follow-ons to this 
research effort and are discussed in chapter 3.  The first proposed study would involve a 
cluster analysis to gain a better understanding about how NASA Centers are grouping.  
For example, are they grouped together based on research focus or on culture?  The ideas 
for the second study and third study proposed emerged during face-to-face interviews 
with NASA systems engineers (NASA, 2014).  The second study proposes the design of 
a series of tools for systems engineers to use based on their project and knowledge base.  
The third study proposes a parallel study be conducted with the space launch systems 
using model-based systems engineering.   
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 One limitation of this study involves the different methods that were used to 
gather data in each of the three phases.  In the 2007 MSFC flight hardware study, all the 
data was gathered through interviews and from one NASA Center location.  This means 
that the responses to questions were coded and calculated for the correlation matrix by 
the experimenters, rather than the participants themselves.  In the 2013 government and 
commercial organizations study, participants were primarily from the Midwest and 
Southeast areas of the country.  Those participants also answered questions on a 4-point 
Likert scale, and answered questions based on a project that had completed all phases of 
its lifecycle.  In the 2014 NASA study, participants were identified using targeted 
sampling.  These participants filled out a modified data collection instrument that 
employed a 7-poing Likert scale, and they were allowed to answer questions based on 
projects that were cancelled and did not complete all phases of its lifecycle or projects 
that were still in progress. 
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CHAPTER 3. GENERAL CONCLUSTION 
 
General Discussion 
 This thesis addressed whether variations in the systems engineering processes 
applied to complex projects impact project success differently based on organization 
type.  Specifically, the organizations tested were government organizations, commercial 
organizations, and NASA, with NASA as the focal point of the study.  This research was 
performed because NASA’s budget is becoming incrementally tighter each year.  
However, the projects NASA engineers work on are not becoming cheaper or easier.  
Therefore, NASA systems engineers must work harder to meet project deadlines and 
ensure project success under tighter budgets.  One of the best ways to do this is to 
implement good systems engineering processes.  In addition to studying systems 
engineering processes, the study also examined the effects of engineering management 
variables on project success for NASA engineers.  Finally, differences among 
organizations based on project description variables, project success metrics, and systems 
engineering processes were studied. 
 An exhaustive literature review recognized Couillard’s work in 1995 as the 
foundation for defining project success metrics and three focus areas for further review.  
The literature review also defined project success as any project that is able to 
successfully complete its lifecycle.  The three focus areas of systems engineering in the 
literature were: NASA systems engineering and integration effectiveness, government 
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and commercial organizations systems engineering effectiveness, and space project cost 
estimating with project management variables.   
 The overall study took part in three phases: a 2007 MSFC Flight Hardware study, 
a 2013 Government and Commercial Organizations study, and a 2014 NASA study, with 
the 2014 NASA study as the focal point for this thesis.  For the 2014 NASA study, a 
modified data collection instrument was constructed from the 2013 study.  Questions 
were modified to better address situations NASA engineers would experience, and three 
additional sections were added to the modified data collection instrument to gain further 
insight.  Of the three additional sections, the section identifying the influence of non-
technical variables was discussed at length.  For the 2014 NASA study, 51 NASA 
engineers participated in providing data.  These engineers are representative of all 10 
NASA Centers, as well as NASA Headquarters.  The 2013 Government and Commercial 
Organizations study provided data from 129 participants, with 46 government 
organization participants and 83 commercial organization participants. 
 Matrices were used as a method to gather information on the similarities and 
differences organizations have on significant correlations between the project success 
metrics and NASA’s 17 systems engineering processes.  In both the 2007 NASA MSFC 
Flight Hardware study and 2007 NASA study, significant correlations existed for back-
end processes relating to project synthesis.  Regarding the 2013 Government and 
Commercial organizations study and 2014 NASA study, almost twice as many significant 
correlations were produced for the 2014 study than the 2013 study.  Matrices were also 
examined between the 2013 government-focused projects, 2013 commercial-focused 
projects, and the 2014 NASA study.  Finally, significant correlations between non-
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technical variables and project success for the 2014 NASA study showed that familiarity 
in project details is significantly correlated to schedule, team experience is significantly 
correlated to budget, and level of testing is significantly correlated to overall project 
success from the stakeholder’s view. 
 Three one-way ANOVA tables were constructed to identify similarities and 
differences among organizations in regards to project description variables, project 
success metrics, and the systems engineering processes.  In regard to project description 
variables, commercial organizations and NASA engineers were both found to be 
significantly different from government organizations, but not from each other.  
However, in regard to project success metrics, no significant difference was found 
between government and commercial organizations or between commercial organizations 
and NASA engineers, but commercial organizations and NASA engineers were 
determined to be significantly different in respect to project success metrics.  Finally, 
with regard to systems engineering processes, no significant difference was found 
between government and commercial organizations, but both were significantly different 
from NASA engineers. 
 
Recommendations for Future Research 
 Recommendations for future research are based on results from the matrices, one-
way ANOVA tables, and face-to-face interviews with NASA systems engineers. 
 The matrices looked at significant correlations between project success metrics 
and NASA’s 17 systems engineering processes.  Figure 3 had shown the 2007 NASA 
MSFC Flight Hardware study and the 2014 NASA study to have similarities in project 
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synthesis, but in almost no other location.  The 2014 NASA study also produced almost 
twice as many significant correlations as the 2013 government and commercial 
organizations study, as seen in figure 4.  More interestingly, few correlations between the 
two studies shown in figure 4 overlapped.  When the 2013 study was broken up into two 
matrices based on their organizations’ focused projects (figure 5 and figure 6) and 
compared against the 2014 NASA study, again few correlations overlapped.  Additional 
data is needed due to the similarities and more importantly the differences that were 
discovered among the matrices for where significant correlations were located based on 
the study examined.  Finally, additional data should be gathered to continue to explore 
how engineering management variables impact project success. 
The final portion of the data analysis displayed an additional 10 one-way 
ANOVA tables constructed to identify similarities and differences among the modified 
data collection instrument’s questions based on organization.  The sections of the 
modified data collection instrument were in regards to: project description variables, 
project success metrics, systems engineering processes, and non-technical variables.  In 
regard to the project description variables, statistically significant differences were 
detected in commercial-focused projects in commercial organizations, but no statistically 
significant differences were discovered within government-focused projects in 
commercial organizations or NASA.  When testing for questions effects in among project 
success metrics, statistically significant differences were detected within government-
focused projects in commercial organizations, commercial-focused projects in 
commercial organizations, and in NASA projects.  No statistically significant differences 
were detected in NASA projects among the systems engineering processes, but 
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significant differences were detected within government-focused projects in commercial 
organizations and within commercial-focused projects in commercial organizations.  The 
final ANOVA table tested for statistically significant question effects among non-
technical variables within NASA projects.  This test did indicated statistically significant 
differences among non-technical variables within NASA projects. 
 Additional data and research is necessary based on the results from the hypotheses 
that were tested using the one-way ANOVA tables.  Organizations were significantly 
different from each other in a different manor in each of the three sections tested using 
one-way ANOVA tables: the project descriptions variables section, project success 
metrics section, and systems engineering processes section.  Also, in the systems 
engineering processes section, the organization and question interaction effects produced 
interesting results that should be followed up on, as well as the question effect.  This was 
seen in table 13 and figure 13. 
 Based on the results from the matrices and one-way ANOVA tables, other than 
the need to gather supplemental data, two additional tasks are necessary for this research.  
The first task is to test a cluster analysis theory and see if certain NASA Centers cluster 
together.  Centers are generally groups into one of three categories: human, research and 
robotics.  A cluster analysis would be able to test if Centers are grouping into their Center 
type in regards to systems engineering based on their center description or if it is 
something else, for example location.   Cultural differences among NASA Centers and a 
fear of getting too large to be successful at systems engineering has been present since 
the days of Wernher von Braun (Sato, 2005).  The second task that needs to be conducted 
is text mining for the additional comments made by participants on the modified data 
 96 
collection instrument.  The engineers who filled out the modified data collection 
instrument used the additional comments sections liberally.  By applying text mining to 
these sections, additional information might be gleaned that originally was not captured 
through the use of a 7-point Likert scale only. 
The following recommendations for future research were discovered through 
face-to-face interviews with NASA systems engineers (NASA, 2014).  Two propositions 
will be discussed in detail: a collection of practical systems engineering tools titled, “The 
Bell Curve”, and a parallel model based engineering study with the Space Launch 
System. 
 Systems engineers at NASA are looking for more practical tools for practitioners 
to use, but understand one universal tool is not realistic.  Therefore, a combination of 
tools for engineers to use on projects can be modeled after a bell curve.  The bottom of 
the bell curve would be for those individuals doing projects that are small and are 
unwilling to invest their time and effort into learning NASA’s 17 systems engineering 
processes.  Their tool would be something like a 30 page cookbook.  Despite many 
feelings on engineers using cookbooks, it still could potentially be better for them to use a 
cookbook tool than no tools at all.  The middle of the curve would consist of a tool called 
the System Integrated Model for Project Lifecycle (SIMPL), and would be used for the 
bulk of the projects done at NASA.  SIMPL would be a computer program where at the 
beginning of your project, a project team member would answer what kind of project 
they were about to begin working on by answering some questions, most likely less than 
100 questions.  This would be similar to straw man requirements.  An algorithm would 
then go through the database of all projects ever done at NASA and the five projects most 
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similar to yours would populate.  In doing so, the goal would be for SIMPL to help you 
figure out cost estimation, types of requirements you would need, etc.  The program 
would help you create system models for you to use for doing the early conceptual work 
so that later on you can make modifications as necessary during the project’s lifetime.  
Finally the top of the bell curve would cater to high-end projects.  It would be more of a 
how to help you make an effective board structure and effectively implement the system, 
rather than advice on how to structure the system. 
 NASA is in the process of trying to embrace model-based systems engineering.  
For example, NASA Langley Research Center has conducted a pilot program to evaluate 
the benefits of using a Model-Based Systems Engineering (MBSE) approach during the 
early phase of the Materials International Space Station Experiment-X project.  The goal 
was to understand the net gain of utilizing this approach on a moderate size flight project 
(Vipavetz, Murphy, & Infeld, 2012).  However, there is potential for additional work to 
be done, especially regarding the Space Launch System. 
 NASA is still a very document centric organization.  When NASA captures 
requirements, they do so by capturing all the artifacts in systems engineering in a static 
format instead of a modeling format.  NASA does do modeling for things, like to see how 
a vehicle will operate.  However, those are design models to see how a rocket will fly 
through the atmosphere and handle the loads, how the rocket will handle acoustic 
environments or to see the different stresses, loads, and structural integrity of the vehicle.  
However, true modeling of the system where we have requirements and verification and 
all 17 systems engineering processes within the same model does not currently exist.  
NASA does the majority of its early processes through plain, static document capturing.   
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 NASA does some requirements management in a requirements database called, 
Cradle, where the Agency does vehicle performance modeling within software models.  
But, tying them all together into one true model does not currently exist in its entirety for 
a project.  With the Space Launch System (SLS), there is a tight schedule and budget, so 
the Agency is unwilling to experiment with new ways of doing things. 
 The proposed idea is to try doing MBSE with a cube satellite on a smaller scale 
with a shorter lifecycle.  Approved at the beginning of 2014 was for SLS to have 
secondary payloads, almost like cube satellites, that will fly in one of the adaptors in SLS.  
Once the crew capsule is released and goes on its way, 12 of these secondary payloads 
will be released. 
 Due to NASA’s current setup, one cannot just go into a model and see all the 
different pieces of a project that are required to fit it.  All the different pieces are in 
different models or documents.  So the best way to run a study is to do a parallel activity 
with a big program development like SLS.  The study would use the same information to 
develop a whole end-to-end process.  A full model based system could be done without 
intruding on the main work of the program, and show as a parallel effort how much more 
efficiently MBSE is.  Furthermore, as the program matures, the metrics can be looked at 
and analyzed.  For example, how much time it took to do some portion of tracing the 
design implementation all the way back through the requirements versus how quickly it 
could be done in the whole system model. 
 However, a major obstacle would be persuading the SLS program to let 
researchers use their data and conduct a MBSE parallel case study.  NASA is a 
government agency that must risk adverse because if a new way of trying systems 
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engineering did not work, the outcome could be detrimental with the worst-case scenario 
being if the crew’s safety were affected.  It is recognized that there are many factors 
affecting why NASA is not progressing in systems engineering as quickly as industry.  
The most successful way to attempt a project like this would be for it to be done through 
a research institution where the researchers could show NASA how MBSE can be useful, 
and then lead NASA over to alternative and potentially better ways of doing systems 
engineering. 
 
Limitations of the Study 
 The greatest potential limitations in this study were due to the participants and the 
data gathered.  In the 2007 MSFC Flight Hardware study, all data was gathered through 
interviews and from one NASA Center location.  Therefore, the questions coded and the 
correlations calculated in the matrix were created by the experimenters.  In the 2013 
Government and Commercial Organizations study, participants were primarily from the 
Midwest and Southeast areas of the country.  Those participants also filled out the data 
collection instrument on a 4-point Likert scale and were to only answer the questions 
based on a project that had completed all phases of its lifecycle.  In the 2014 NASA 
study, participants were collected through targeted sampling, filled out a modified data 
collection instrument on a 7-point Likert scale, and were allowed to answer questions 
based on projects that were cancelled and did not complete all phases of its lifecycle or 
based on projects still in progress and have not yet had a chance to complete all phases of 
its lifecycle.  Due to the differences stated above in the three phases of the study, a 
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potential limitation was the inconsistency in how the data was gathered from one phase to 
the next.   
Allowing the 2014 NASA study engineers to answer questions on the modified 
data collection instrument based on projects cancelled or not yet completed was 
necessary in order to receive their participation.  Because projects take so long at NASA 
and are often cancelled, such, as with Ares, few engineers would have been able to 
participate in the study if this allowance had not been made.  However, due to this 
allowance, another inconsistency might have been created since all participants in the 
2013 Government and Commercial Organizations study answered questions based on 
projects that had completed their life cycle. 
Since the 2007 MSFC Flight Hardware study was conducted through interviews, 
the option of Not Applicable did not exist.  However, in the 2013 and 2014 study, it did.  
Table 34 identifies the number of participants who chose to answer Not Applicable in the 
2013 Government and Commercial Organization study and the 2014 NASA study for the 
Project Success Metrics section and the Systems Engineering Processes section.  The 
highlighted rows draw your attention to the questions where the total between the 2013 
and 2014 study, more than 10 applicants answered Note Applicable.  One notable 
observation are the systems engineering processes 5 – 9.  All those processes had a large 
number of Not Applicable responses, which then translated into missings for the data 
analysis, with a sizeable portion of those missings coming from the 2014 NASA study 
participants.  It is uncertain why so many Not Applicable responses came from this area 
of the processes, but it should be noted that those processes that are highlighted almost 
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completely make up the back portion of the “Vee”, which handles project synthesis.  Due 
to the number of missings in this section, further investigation should be conducted. 
 
Table 34. Number of Not Applicable Responses from Participants in Organizations  
Question  
Section 
Organization 
Total Responses /180 
Commercial /83  Government /46 NASA /51 
PSM1 1 0 6 7 
PSM2 5 2 5 12 
PSM3 1 0 5 6 
PSM4 2 2 6 10 
PSM5 3 2 4 9 
PSM6 6 5 5 16 
PSM7 4 2 3 9 
PSM8 9 0 3 12 
PSM9 1 0 3 4 
SE1 5 0 0 5 
SE2 3 0 0 3 
SE3 2 1 2 5 
SE4 4 1 0 5 
SE5 5 1 7 13 
SE6 7 3 9 19 
SE7 5 5 9 19 
SE8 6 5 10 21 
SE9 8 3 16 27 
SE10 2 2 0 4 
SE11 3 3 1 7 
SE12 3 0 3 6 
SE13 2 0 2 4 
SE14 3 0 1 4 
SE15 1 0 1 2 
SE16 3 1 1 5 
SE17 2 0 3 5 
 
 
 Due to the number of Not Applicable responses, 500 iterations were run in R 
Studio to impute those missing.  The correlations for the Project Success metrics and 
Systems Engineering processes for the 2014 NASA study were then calculated for the 
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500 iterations and a mean for the 500 iterations, as well as its standard deviation were 
produced.  A sample of the means and standard deviations from the correlations is 
illustrated in Table 35.  Table 35 shows the correlations from the 2014 NASA study 
matrix that contained high standard deviations that show that the data points are spread 
out over a large range of values.  Therefore, the standard deviations are great enough to 
make correlations listed in table 35 either significant, or remove them from being 
significant.   This simulation further supports how the study would benefit from 
additional data. 
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Table 35. Correlations Between Systems Engineering Processes and Project Success 
Metrics with High Standard Deviations 
 
Question Mean Standard Deviation 
PSM4.SE4 0.343 0.065 
PSM9.SE4 0.384 0.018 
PSM2.SE5 0.431 0.0487 
PSM4.SE5 0.364 0.051 
PSM8.SE5 0.391 0.065 
PSM9.SE5 0.411 0.079 
PSM1.SE6 0.428 0.073 
PSM2.SE6 0.465 0.081 
PSM4.SE6 0.396 0.083 
PSM6.SE6 0.350 0.093 
PSM8.SE6 0.402 0.114 
PSM9.SE6 0.362 0.123 
PSM1.SE7 0.395 0.057 
PSM4.SE7 0.327 0.073 
PSM8.SE7 0.409 0.079 
PSM9.SE7 0.399 0.074 
PSM7.SE8 0.331 0.130 
PSM8.SE8 0.292 0.132 
PSM9.SE8 0.364 0.140 
PSM3.SE10 0.462 0.072 
PSM4.SE10 0.438 0.060 
PSM7.SE10 0.398 0.017 
PSM4.SE11 0.386 0.038 
PSM8.SE11 0.406 0.017 
PSM1.SE12 0.418 0.042 
PSM2.SE12 0.4287 0.032 
PSM8.SE12 0.390 0.023 
PSM9.SE12 0.410 0.023 
PSM1.SE13 0.396 0.043 
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APPENDIX A. MODIFIED DATA COLLECTION INSTRUMENT 
 
The purpose of this survey is to gather information on what factor’s influence a 
project’s success at NASA. 
Please focus on one, specific project when completing the survey. 
The data collected in this survey will be used to help managers at NASA better 
utilize their resources. 
Your contribution to this survey is anonymous and confidential.  Information 
released will be in aggregate. 
Please feel free to contact me.  Kathryne Schomburg at Iowa State University, if you 
have any questions or concerns at kathryne@iastate.edu. 
Thank you in advance for your contribution! 
 
CD 1 – CD 4 = Company Description Question Block 
 
CD1   
1. My organization is part of the: 
- Public Sector 
- Private sector (publicly traded) 
- Other (please specify) ______________ 
 
CD1.1  
1.1 I am physically located at the: 
- Ames Research Center 
- Armstrong Flight Research Center 
 - Glenn Research Center 
 - Goddard Space Flight Center 
 - Goddard Institute of Space Studies 
 - Independent Verification and Validation Facility 
 - Jet Propulsion Laboratory 
 - Johnson Space Center 
 - Kennedy Space Center 
 - Langley Research Center 
 - Marshall Space Flight Center 
 - Michoud Assembly Facility 
 - NASA Headquarters 
 - NASA Shard Services Center 
 - Plum Brook Station  
 - Stennis Space Center 
 - Wallops Flight Facility 
 - White Sands Test Facility 
 - Other (please specify) ______________ 
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CD2  
2. My organization’s industry or service is best described by (select the most 
representative category): 
 - Aerospace 
- Agriculture 
- Communications 
- Defense & Security 
- Electronics & Electrical 
- Energy 
- Environmental 
- Health & Welfare 
- Infrastructure 
- Transportation 
- Other (please specify): ______________ 
 
CD3 
3. Within my physical location, Systems Engineering skills and responsibilities are: 
 - Contained in a single department 
 - Distributed throughout the organization 
 - Managed by a single department, but execution is done at the project level 
 - Not formally recognized in the organization 
 - Other (please specify): ______________ 
 
CD4 
4. We track SE effectiveness (select all that apply):       
 - At the organization level 
 - At the overall project level 
 - At the project task level 
 - At the individual level 
 - We do not track SE effectiveness 
 
5. Please Share your organization’s name (optional): 
 ______________________________ 
 
6. Additional thoughts, comments, information regarding your company description 
(optional)? 
 ______________________________ 
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PD1 – PD4 = Project Description Question Block 
 
PD1 
7.  This project was representative of the scope of work my organization typically 
completes. 
 - Strongly Agree 
 - Agree 
 - Somewhat Agree 
 - Neither Agree nor Disagree 
 - Somewhat Disagree 
 - Disagree 
 - Strongly Disagree 
 - Not Applicable 
 
PD2 
8. This project had significant technical risk. 
 - Strongly Agree 
 - Agree 
 - Somewhat Agree 
 - Neither Agree nor Disagree 
 - Somewhat Disagree 
 - Disagree 
 - Strongly Disagree 
 - Not Applicable 
 
PD3 
9. This project had significant budgetary risk. 
 - Strongly Agree 
- Agree 
 - Somewhat Agree 
 - Neither Agree nor Disagree 
 - Somewhat Disagree 
 - Disagree 
 - Strongly Disagree 
 - Not Applicable 
 
PD4 
10. This project had significant schedule risk. 
 - Agree 
 - Somewhat Agree 
 - Neither Agree nor Disagree 
 - Somewhat Disagree 
 - Disagree 
 - Strongly Disagree 
 - Not Applicable 
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PD5   
11. Which SE standard(s) was (were) used on this project (select all that apply):   
 - No standard was used 
 - Internally developed standard 
 - Defense Acquisition Guidebook 
 - ANSI/GEIA EIA-632 
 - EIA/IS 731.1 
 - IEEE 1220-2005 
 - ISO/IEC 15288 
 - ISO/IEC 15504: 2004 
 - ISO 10303-AP233 
 - CMMI 
 - NASA NPR 7123 
 - Other (please specify): __________________ 
 
PD6 
12. This project used a tailored approach based on the above SE standard(s): 
 - Followed the standard(s) with no tailoring 
 - Some tailoring of the standard(s) 
 - Extensive tailoring of the standard(s) 
 - No standard was followed – no tailoring 
 
PD7  
13. This project’s primary focus is for: 
 - Aeronautics 
 - Human Exploration and Operations 
 - Science 
 - Space Technology 
 - Office of the Chief Technologist 
 - Other (please specify): ___________________ 
 
14. Additional thoughts, comments, information regarding your project description 
(optional)? 
 ________________________________ 
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PSM1 – PSM9 = Project Success Metrics Question Block 
 
PSM1  
15. This project was a success when compared to the original technical requirements. 
 - Strongly Agree 
 - Agree 
 - Somewhat Agree 
 - Neither Agree nor Disagree 
 - Somewhat Disagree 
 - Disagree 
 - Strongly Disagree 
 - Not Applicable 
 
PSM2  
16. This project was a technical success when compared to other similar projects. 
 - Strongly Agree 
 - Agree 
 - Somewhat Agree 
 - Neither Agree nor Disagree 
 - Somewhat Disagree 
 - Disagree 
 - Strongly Disagree 
 - Not Applicable 
 
PSM3  
17. This project was a success when compared to the original project schedule 
 - Strongly Agree 
 - Agree 
 - Somewhat Agree 
 - Neither Agree nor Disagree 
 - Somewhat Disagree 
 - Disagree 
 - Strongly Disagree 
 - Not Applicable 
 
PSM4  
18. This project was a scheduling success when compared to other similar projects. 
 - Strongly Agree 
 - Agree 
 - Somewhat Agree 
 - Neither Agree nor Disagree 
 - Somewhat Disagree 
 - Disagree 
 - Strongly Disagree 
 - Not Applicable 
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PSM5  
19.  This project was a success when compared to the original project budget. 
 - Strongly Agree 
 - Agree 
 - Somewhat Agree 
 - Neither Agree nor Disagree 
 - Somewhat Disagree 
 - Disagree 
 - Strongly Disagree 
 - Not Applicable 
 
PSM6  
20. This project was a budgeting success when compared to other similar projects. 
 - Strongly Agree 
 - Agree 
 - Somewhat Agree 
 - Neither Agree nor Disagree 
 - Somewhat Disagree 
 - Disagree 
 - Strongly Disagree 
 - Not Applicable 
 
 
PSM7  
21. The project management process used was effective. 
 - Strongly Agree 
 - Agree 
 - Somewhat Agree 
 - Neither Agree nor Disagree 
 - Somewhat Disagree 
 - Disagree 
 - Strongly Disagree 
 - Not Applicable 
 
PSM8  
22. Overall this project was viewed by our organization as a success. 
 - Strongly Agree 
 - Agree 
 - Somewhat Agree 
 - Neither Agree nor Disagree 
 - Somewhat Disagree 
 - Disagree 
 - Strongly Disagree 
 - Not Applicable 
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PSM9  
23.Overall this project was viewed by our stakeholders as a success. 
 - Strongly Agree 
 - Agree 
 - Somewhat Agree 
 - Neither Agree nor Disagree 
 - Somewhat Disagree 
 - Disagree 
 - Strongly Disagree 
 - Not Applicable 
 
24.  Additional thoughts, comments, information regarding your project success metrics 
(optional)? 
 ______________________________ 
 
SE1 – SE17 = Systems Engineering Processes Question Block 
 
There are three sets of common technical processes in the NASA Systems 
Engineering Processes and Requirements: system design, product realization, and 
technical management.  The processes in these three sets collectively make up 17 
steps known as the “systems engineering engine”.  The 17 questions in this section 
are a reflection of the 17 steps in the “systems engineering engine”. 
 
SE1  
25. This project identified all the stakeholders and their expectations for the system under 
development. 
 - Strongly Agree 
 - Agree 
 - Somewhat Agree 
 - Neither Agree nor Disagree 
 - Somewhat Disagree 
 - Disagree 
 - Strongly Disagree 
 - Not Applicable 
 
SE2  
26. The project transformed stakeholder expectations into unique, quantitative, and 
measurable technical requirements that can be used for defining a design solution. 
 - Strongly Agree 
 - Agree 
 - Somewhat Agree 
 - Neither Agree nor Disagree 
 - Somewhat Disagree 
 - Disagree 
 - Strongly Disagree 
 - Not Applicable 
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SE3  
27. This project decomposed and allocated requirements to the lowest possible level of 
the system. 
 - Strongly Agree 
 - Agree 
 - Somewhat Agree 
 - Neither Agree nor Disagree 
 - Somewhat Disagree 
 - Disagree 
 - Strongly Disagree 
 - Not Applicable 
 
SE4  
28. This project translated the requirements into a design solution. 
 - Strongly Agree 
 - Agree 
 - Somewhat Agree 
 - Neither Agree nor Disagree 
 - Somewhat Disagree 
 - Disagree 
 - Strongly Disagree 
 - Not Applicable 
 
SE5  
29. This project translated the design solution into the actual system. 
 - Strongly Agree 
 - Agree 
 - Somewhat Agree 
 - Neither Agree nor Disagree 
 - Somewhat Disagree 
 - Disagree 
 - Strongly Disagree 
 - Not Applicable 
 
SE6  
30. This project integrated lower level products into higher level products and ensured 
proper functionality of the system. 
 - Strongly Agree 
 - Agree 
 - Somewhat Agree 
 - Neither Agree nor Disagree 
 - Somewhat Disagree 
 - Disagree 
 - Strongly Disagree 
 - Not Applicable 
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SE7  
31. The project conducted a verification program to ensure the end product conforms to 
design requirements and specifications (the system was completed correctly). 
 - Strongly Agree 
 - Agree 
 - Somewhat Agree 
 - Neither Agree nor Disagree 
 - Somewhat Disagree 
 - Disagree 
 - Strongly Disagree 
 - Not Applicable 
 
SE8  
32. This project conducted a validation program to ensure the end product satisfied 
stakeholder expectations and would perform its intended use or function (the correct 
system was completed). 
 - Strongly Agree 
 - Agree 
 - Somewhat Agree 
 - Neither Agree nor Disagree 
 - Somewhat Disagree 
 - Disagree 
 - Strongly Disagree 
 - Not Applicable 
 
SE9  
33. This project transitioned a verified and validated realized system to a customer at the 
next level of integration or the end-user. 
 - Strongly Agree 
 - Agree 
 - Somewhat Agree 
 - Neither Agree nor Disagree 
 - Somewhat Disagree 
 - Disagree 
 - Strongly Disagree 
 - Not Applicable 
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SE10  
34. This project established a plan to apply and manage the technical processes within all 
technical and programmatic constraints. 
 - Strongly Agree 
 - Agree 
 - Somewhat Agree 
 - Neither Agree nor Disagree 
 - Somewhat Disagree 
 - Disagree 
 - Strongly Disagree 
 - Not Applicable 
 
SE11  
35. The project managed the product requirements providing traceability and changes to 
established requirements. 
 - Strongly Agree 
 - Agree 
 - Somewhat Agree 
 - Neither Agree nor Disagree 
 - Somewhat Disagree 
 - Disagree 
 - Strongly Disagree 
 - Not Applicable 
 
SE12  
36. This project managed interface development, maintaining definition and compliance. 
 - Strongly Agree 
 - Agree 
 - Somewhat Agree 
 - Neither Agree nor Disagree 
 - Somewhat Disagree 
 - Disagree 
 - Strongly Disagree 
 - Not Applicable 
 
SE13  
37. This project measured, assessed, and managed risk. 
 - Strongly Agree 
 - Agree 
 - Somewhat Agree 
 - Neither Agree nor Disagree 
 - Somewhat Disagree 
 - Disagree 
 - Strongly Disagree 
 - Not Applicable 
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SE14 
38. This project identified, controlled, and preserved (recorded) the system configuration. 
 - Strongly Agree 
 - Agree 
 - Somewhat Agree 
 - Neither Agree nor Disagree 
 - Somewhat Disagree 
 - Disagree 
 - Strongly Disagree 
 - Not Applicable 
 
SE15  
39.  This project managed the identification, acquisition, access, protection, and 
distribution of technical data. 
 - Strongly Agree 
 - Agree 
 - Somewhat Agree 
 - Neither Agree nor Disagree 
 - Somewhat Disagree 
 - Disagree 
 - Strongly Disagree 
 - Not Applicable 
 
SE16  
40. This project monitored technical progress and provided status updates in support of 
the systems engineering process. 
 - Strongly Agree 
 - Agree 
 - Somewhat Agree 
 - Neither Agree nor Disagree 
 - Somewhat Disagree 
 - Disagree 
 - Strongly Disagree 
 - Not Applicable 
 
SE17 
41. This project employed established decision analysis processes regarding technical 
decisions, alternatives, and uncertainties impacting cost, schedule, and risk. 
 - Strongly Agree 
 - Agree 
 - Somewhat Agree 
 - Neither Agree nor Disagree 
 - Somewhat Disagree 
 - Disagree 
 - Strongly Disagree 
 - Not Applicable 
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42. Additional thoughts, comments, information regarding your systems engineering 
processes (optional)? 
 _________________________________ 
 
DTMI = Distributed Team Member Interactions Question Block 
 
DTMI1 
43. How many groups of team members at remote locations were involved in your 
project’s day-to-day work (i.e. you cannot easily walk over to talk with them)? 
 __________ 
 
DTMI2 
44. For your project, what is the average percentage of your total team that typically 
participated in meetings from other location? 
______% 
 
DTMI3            
45. Please indicate what percentages of your team meetings were informal versus formal 
(i.e. brainstorming versus design reviews). 
 Formal team meetings  _____ 
 Informal team meetings  _____ 
Total     100 % 
 
DTMI4            
46.  If some of your meetings involved virtual participants, what technologies did you use 
(select all that apply)? 
 - Telephone conferencing system 
 - Shared desktop software (e.g. WebEx, Lync, Connect, Sametime, etc.) 
 - Low fidelity video conferencing (e.g. Skype, webcam) 
- High fidelity video conferencing systems (e.g. point-to-point video 
conferencing) 
 - Electronic distribution of documents (e.g. email) 
 - Shared drawing surfaces (e.g. electronic whiteboards) 
 - Text-based communication software (e.g. Google chat, Facebook, cellphone) 
 - Other (please specify): __________________ 
 
47. List any differences you have noticed when having virtual meetings instead of face-
to-face meetings (optional): 
 
  _________________________________________ 
 
  
 117 
DTMI6 
48. On average, how often do you interact with your team members who are located at 
the same facility as you? 
 - Daily 
 - 2-3 Times a Wee 
 - Once a Week 
 - 2-3 Times a Month 
 - Once a Month 
 - Less than Once a Month 
 - Annually 
 
DTMI7 
49. On average, how often do you interact with your team members who are located at a 
different facility than you? 
 - Daily 
 - 2-3 Times a Wee 
 - Once a Week 
 - 2-3 Times a Month 
 - Once a Month 
 - Less than Once a Month 
 - Annually 
 
50. Additional thoughts, comments, information regarding your team dynamics 
(optional)? 
 ______________________________ 
 
NTV = Non-Technical Variables Question Block 
 
NTV1 
51. I was very familiar with the details of the project during the project life cycle. 
 - Strongly Agree 
 - Agree 
 - Somewhat Agree 
 - Neither Agree nor Disagree 
 - Somewhat Disagree 
 - Disagree 
 - Strongly Disagree 
 - Not Applicable 
 
NTV2  
52. I was a part of this project from the birth of the project through to the end of the 
project’s completion. 
 - Yes 
 - No 
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NTV3  
53. I was professionally invested in the project. 
 - Strongly Agree 
 - Agree 
 - Somewhat Agree 
 - Neither Agree nor Disagree 
 - Somewhat Disagree 
 - Disagree 
 - Strongly Disagree 
 - Not Applicable 
 
NTV4  
54. I was personally invested in the project. 
 - Strongly Agree 
 - Agree 
 - Somewhat Agree 
 - Neither Agree nor Disagree 
 - Somewhat Disagree 
 - Disagree 
 - Strongly Disagree 
 - Not Applicable 
 
NTV5  
55. How many other projects were you involved with while working on this project? 
 - 0 
 - 1 
 - 2 
 - 3 
 - 4+ 
 
NTV6  
56. Funding constraints positively impacted the project’s success. 
 - Strongly Agree 
 - Agree 
 - Somewhat Agree 
 - Neither Agree nor Disagree 
 - Somewhat Disagree 
 - Disagree 
 - Strongly Disagree 
 - Not Applicable 
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NTV7  
57. Volatility of requirements positively impacted the project’s success. 
 - Strongly Agree 
 - Agree 
 - Somewhat Agree 
 - Neither Agree nor Disagree 
 - Somewhat Disagree 
 - Disagree 
 - Strongly Disagree 
 - Not Applicable 
 
NTV8  
58. Team experience positively impacted the project’s success. 
 - Strongly Agree 
 - Agree 
 - Somewhat Agree 
 - Neither Agree nor Disagree 
 - Somewhat Disagree 
 - Disagree 
 - Strongly Disagree 
 - Not Applicable 
 
NTV9  
59. The level of testing positively impacted the project’s success. 
 - Strongly Agree 
 - Agree 
 - Somewhat Agree 
 - Neither Agree nor Disagree 
 - Somewhat Disagree 
 - Disagree 
 - Strongly Disagree 
 - Not Applicable 
 
NTV10  
60. Development duration (in month) positively impacted the project’s success. 
 - Strongly Agree 
 - Agree 
 - Somewhat Agree 
 - Neither Agree nor Disagree 
 - Somewhat Disagree 
 - Disagree 
 - Strongly Disagree 
 - Not Applicable 
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NTV11  
61. The number of organizations involved positively impacted the project’s success. 
 - Strongly Agree 
 - Agree 
 - Somewhat Agree 
 - Neither Agree nor Disagree 
 - Somewhat Disagree 
 - Disagree 
 - Strongly Disagree 
 - Not Applicable 
 
NTV12  
62. The degree of formulation study positively impacted the project’s success. 
 - Strongly Agree 
 - Agree 
 - Somewhat Agree 
 - Neither Agree nor Disagree 
 - Somewhat Disagree 
 - Disagree 
 - Strongly Disagree 
 - Not Applicable 
 
NTV13  
63. The new design factor (development of new hardware for this project) positively 
impacted the project’s success. 
 - Strongly Agree 
 - Agree 
 - Somewhat Agree 
 - Neither Agree nor Disagree 
 - Somewhat Disagree 
 - Disagree 
 - Strongly Disagree 
 - Not Applicable 
 
64. Additional thoughts, comments, information regarding your non-technical experience 
(optional): 
 ______________________________ 
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CO = Information on the project’s communication and organization level 
 
CO1 
65. My position the project was: 
 - Project Manager 
 - Deputy Project Manager 
 - Chief Engineer 
 - Deputy Chief Engineer 
 - Systems Engineer 
 - Deputy Systems Engineer 
 - Functional lead Engineer 
 - Design Lead Engineer 
 - Other (please specify): ______________ 
 
CO2 
66. Rate this project’s communication formality versus informality as compared to other 
similar projects: 
 - Very Formal 
 - Formal 
 - Slightly Formal 
 - Average 
 - Less Formal 
  - Informal 
 - Very Informal 
 - Not Applicable 
 
CO3 
67. Rate the communication speed within this project as compared to other similar 
projects: 
 - Extremely Slow 
 - Slow 
 - Somewhat Slow 
 - Average 
 - Somewhat Fast 
 - Fast 
 - Extremely Fast 
 - Not Applicable 
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CO4 
68. Rate this project’s process procedures in terms of flexibility versus standardization 
when compared to other similar projects: 
 - Very Flexible  
 - Flexible 
 - Slightly Flexible 
 - Average 
 - Less Flexible 
 - Standardized 
 - Completely Standardized 
 - Not Applicable 
 
CO5 
69. Rate the complexity of the design mission compared to other projects in the 
organization: 
 - Very Complex 
 - Complex 
 - Slightly Complex 
 - Average 
 - Less Complex 
 - Simple 
 - Very Simple  
 - Not Applicable 
 
CO6 
70. Rate the number of communication gaps seen within this project as compared to other 
similar projects. 
 - An Extreme Amount 
 - Quite a Bit 
 - Some 
 - Average 
 - Few 
 - Almost None 
 - None 
 - Not Applicable 
 
CO7 
71. Please list up to 3 of the 17 steps from the systems engineering engine you consider to 
be most important for the success of the project (optional). 
 Item I:  _________________________ 
 Item II: _________________________ 
 Item III: _________________________ 
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CO8: 
72. From your perspective, describe the formal or informal responsibility you have for 
the systems engineering/ life cycle process of this project.  You may find it helpful to 
discuss the areas that you feel are outside your area of responsibility (optional). 
 
  _________________________________________ 
 
CO9: 
73. Describe the organization structure, including Approval Boards, of the project in 
question (i.e. small management group consisting of X people with matrixed employees 
for task accomplishment from Y and Z areas of the organization (optional). 
 
  _________________________________________ 
 
74. Additional thoughts, comments, information regarding the organization, culture or 
communication influences on the SE process (optional):  
 ______________________________ 
 
ISIS = Informal Subsystems Integration Strategies  
 
The following questions below are about your experiences in facilitating the 
integration of subsystems.  A “margin” is a buffer added to a design parameter, cost 
estimate, or schedule estimate as a hedge against future needs, e.g.: “Holding 
something in your back pocket” during negotiations between subsystems. 
 
ISSI1 
75. In this project, subsystems held back significant margins when negotiating parameter 
integration with other subsystems. 
 - Strongly Agree 
 - Agree 
 - Somewhat Agree 
 - Neither Agree nor Disagree 
 - Somewhat Disagree 
 - Disagree 
 - Strongly Disagree 
 - Not Applicable 
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ISIS2 
76. In this project, subsystems understood when other subsystems were holding back 
margins. 
 - Never 
 - Rarely 
 - Sometimes 
 - Often 
 - Frequently 
 - Almost Always 
 - Always 
 - Not Applicable 
 
ISIS3 
77. In this project, subsystems accounted for the margins of other subsystems when 
making design decisions. 
 - Never 
 - Rarely 
 - Sometimes 
 - Often 
 - Frequently 
 - Almost Always 
 - Always 
 - Not Applicable 
 
ISSI4 
78. In this project, holding back margins during subsystem integration affected the 
overall system integration. 
 - Strongly Agree 
 - Agree 
 - Somewhat Agree 
 - Neither Agree nor Disagree 
 - Somewhat Disagree 
 - Disagree 
 - Strongly Disagree 
 - Not Applicable 
 
79. Additional thoughts, comments, information regarding informal subsystems 
integration strategies (optional):  
 ______________________________ 
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APPENDIX B. TERM DESCRIPTIONS 
 
The following section describes reasoning for select questions and why they were 
asked.  Also, some terms are defined or expanded upon. 
 
 
1. My organization is part of the: 
 
Reasoning: This question was necessary incase any non-NASA systems engineers or 
engineering managers participated in the survey. 
 
1.1. I am physically located at the: 
 
Reasoning: Knowing the participant’s physical location allows us to compare how 
projects are experienced from one center to another.  See www.nasa.gov for more 
information. 
 
2. My organization’s industry or service is best described by (select the most 
representative category): 
 
Reasoning: This question was necessary incase any non-NASA systems engineers 
or engineering managers participated in the survey.  Also, the original data collection 
instrument from the 2013 study included this question and was necessary to maintain 
consistency through the study. 
 
11. Which SE standard(s) was (were) used on this project (select all that apply): 
  
 
Reasoning: Please see http://www.incose.org/practice/standardsupdate.aspx for 
additional information.  
 
13. This project’s primary focus is for: 
 
Reasoning: This question was asked to see if the project experiences within the 
Mission Directorates were uniform.  Please see 
http://www.nasa.gov/offices/education/missions/index.html#.U5XfmxbtBg0 for additional 
information. 
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15. This project was a success when compared to the original technical 
requirements. 
 
16. This project was a technical success when compared to other similar projects. 
 
17. This project was a success when compared to the original project schedule 
 
18. This project was a scheduling success when compared to other similar projects. 
 
19.  This project was a success when compared to the original project budget. 
 
20. This project was a budgeting success when compared to other similar projects. 
 
21. The project management process used was effective. 
 
22. Overall this project was viewed by our organization as a success. 
 
23. Overall this project was viewed by our stakeholders as a success. 
 
Reasoning: Questions 15 – 23 were developed through, “The Role of Project Risk 
in Determining Project Management Approach” and exhibit 3 from “A Preliminary 
Assessment of the Relationship Between Project Success, System Engineering, and Team 
Organization”.  Please see Tech1 (X41), Tech2 (X42), Time (X44), Cost (X43), Process 
(X45) and Overall (X47) for additional information. 
 
25. This project identified all the stakeholders and their expectations for the system 
under development. 
 
Definition: The Stakeholder Expectations Definition Process is the initial process 
within the systems engineering engine that establishes the foundation from which the 
system is designed and the product is realized.  The main purpose of this process is to 
identify who the stakeholders are and how they intend to use the product.  This is usually 
accomplished through use-case scenarios, Design Reference Missions (DRMs), and 
ConOps.  For additional information, please see page 33 of the 2007 NASA handbook. 
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26. The project transformed stakeholder expectations into unique, quantitative, and 
measurable technical requirements that can be used for defining a design solution. 
 
Definition: The Technical Requirements Definition Process transforms the 
stakeholder expectations into a definition of the problem, then into a definition of the 
problem, and then into a complete set of validated technical requirements expressed as 
“shall” statements that can be used for defining a design solution for the Product 
Breakdown Structure (PBS) model and related enabling products.  The process of 
requirements definition is a recursive and iterative one that develops the stakeholders’ 
requirements, product requirements, and lower level product/component requirements 
(e.g., PBS model products such as systems or subsystems and related enabling products 
such as external systems that provide or consume data).  The requirements should enable 
the description of all inputs, outputs, and required relationships between inputs and 
outputs.  The requirements documents organize and communicate requirements to the 
customer and other stakeholders and the technical community.  This applies to the 
definition of all technical requirements from the program, project, and system levels 
down to the lowest level product/component requirements document.  For additional 
information, please see page 40 of the 2007 NASA handbook. 
 
27. This project decomposed and allocated requirements to the lowest possible level 
of the system. 
 
Definition: The Logical Decomposition is the process for creating the detailed 
functional requirements that enable NASA programs and projects to meet the stakeholder 
expectations.  It identifies the “what” that must be achieved by the system at each level to 
enable a successful project.  It also utilizes functional analysis to create a system 
architecture and to decompose top-level (or parent) requirements and allocates them 
down to the lowest desired levels of the project.  For additional information, please see 
page 49 of the handbook. 
 
28. This project translated the requirements into a design solution. 
 
Definition: The Design Solution Definition Process is used to translate the high-
level requirements derived from the stakeholder expectations and the outputs of the 
Logical Decomposition Process into a design solution.  This is transforming the defined 
logical decomposition models and their associated sets of derived technical requirements 
into alternative solutions.  Alternative solutions are analyzed through detailed trade 
studies that result in the selection of a preferred alternative.  The preferred alternative is 
then fully defined into a final design solution that will satisfy the technical requirements.  
The design solution definition will be used to generate the end product specifications that 
will be used to produce the product and to conduct product verification.  The process 
may be further refined depending on whether there are additional subsystems of the end 
product that need to be defined.  For additional information, please see page 55 of the 
NASA handbook.  
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29. This project translated the design solution into the actual system. 
 
Definition: The Product Implementation is the first process encountered in the 
systems engineering engine that begins the movement from the bottom of the product 
hierarch up towards the Product Transition Process.  This is where plans, designs, 
analysis, requirements development, and drawings are realized into actual products.  For 
additional information, please see page 73 of the NASA handbook. 
 
30. This project integrated lower level products into higher-level products and 
ensured proper functionality of the system. 
 
Definition: Product Integration is one of the systems engineering engine product 
realization processes that make up the system structure.  The lower level products are 
assembled into higher-level products and checked to make sure that the integrated 
product function properly.  It is an element of the processes that lead realized products 
from a level below to realize end products at a level above, between the Product 
Implementation, Verification, and Validation Processes.  For additional information, 
please see page 78 of the NASA handbook. 
 
31. The project conducted a verification program to ensure the end product 
conforms to design requirements and specifications (the system was completed 
correctly). 
 
Definition: The Product Verification Process is the first of the verification and 
validation processes conducted on a realized end product.  A realized product is one 
provided by either the Product Implementation Process or the Product Integration 
Process in a form suitable for meeting applicable life-cycle phase success criteria.  
Realization is the act of verifying, validating, and transitioning the realized product for 
use at the next level up of the system structure or to the customer.  This process 
determines if the end product was realized correctly.  For additional information, please 
see page 83 of the NASA handbook. 
 
32. This project conducted a validation program to ensure the end product satisfied 
stakeholder expectations and would perform its intended use or function (the 
correct system was completed). 
 
Definition: The Validation Process is the second of the verification and validation 
processes conducted on a realized end product.  This answers the question of if the 
correct system was done.  It provides objective evidence that every “shall” statement was 
met, whereas validation is performed for the benefit of the customers and users to ensure 
that the system functions in the expected manner when placed in the intended 
environment.  This confirms that realized end products at any position within the system 
structure conform to their set of stakeholder expectations captured in the ConOps, and 
ensures that any anomalies discovered during validation are appropriately resolved prior 
to product delivery.  For additional information, please see page 98 of the NASA 
handbook. 
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33. This project transitioned a verified and validated realized system to a customer 
at the next level of integration or the end-user. 
 
Definition: The Product Transition Process is used to transition a verified and 
validated end product that has been generated by product implementation or product 
integration to the customer at the next level in the system structure for integration into an 
end product or, for the top-level end product, transitioned to the intended end used.  The 
form of the product transitioned will be a function of the product-line life-cycle phase 
success criteria and the location within the system structure of the WBS model in which 
the end product exists.  For additional information, please see page 106 of the NASA 
handbook. 
 
34. This project established a plan to apply and manage the technical processes 
within all technical and programmatic constraints. 
 
Definition: The Technical Planning Process, the first of eight technical 
management processes contained in the systems engineering engine, establishes a plan 
for applying and managing each of the common technical processes that will be used to 
drive the development of system products and associated work products.  It establishes a 
plan for identifying and defining the technical effort required to satisfy the project 
objectives and life-cycle phase success criteria within the cost, schedule, and risk 
constraints of the project.  For additional information, please see page 112 of the NASA 
handbook. 
 
35. The project managed the product requirements providing traceability and 
changes to established requirements. 
 
 Definition: Requirements Management activities apply to the management of all 
stakeholder expectations, customer requirements, and technical product requirements 
down to the lowest level product component requirements (hereafter referred to as 
expectations and requirements).  It is used to: manage the product requirements 
identified, baselined, and used in the definition of the work breakdown structure (WBS) 
model products during system design, provides bi-directional traceability back to the top 
WBS model requirements, and manage the changes to established requirement baselines 
over the life cycle of the system products.  For additional information, please see page 
131 of the NASA handbook. 
 
36. This project managed interface development, maintaining definition and 
compliance. 
 
Definition: The management and control for interfaces is crucial to successful 
programs or projects.  The interface management is a process to assist in controlling 
product development when efforts are divided among parties (e.g. Government, 
contractors, geographically diverse technical teams) and/or  to define and maintain 
compliance among the products that must interoperate.  For additional information, 
please see page 136 of the NASA handbook. 
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37. This project measured, assessed, and managed risk. 
 
Definition: The Technical Risk Management Process is one of the crosscutting 
technical management processes.  Risk is defined as the combination of (1) the 
probability that a program or project will experience an undesired event and (2) the 
consequences, impact, or severity of the undesired event, were it to occur.  Technical risk 
management is an organized, systematic risk-informed decision making discipline that 
proactively identifies, analyzes, plans, tracks, controls communicates, documents, and 
manages risk to increase the likelihood of achieving project goals.  Risk Management 
Process focuses on project objectives, bringing to bear an analytical basis for risk 
management decisions and the ensuing management activities, and a framework for 
dealing with uncertainty.  For additional information, please see page 139 of the NASA 
handbook. 
 
38. This project identified, controlled, and preserved (recorded) the system 
configuration. 
 
Definition: Configuration Management is a management discipline applied over 
the product’s life cycle to provide visibility into and to control changes to performance 
and functional and physical characteristics.  Configuration management ensures that the 
configuration of a product is known and reflected in product information, that any 
product change is beneficial and is effected without adverse consequences, and that 
changes are managed.  Configuration management reduces technical risks by ensuring 
correct product configurations, distinguishes among product versions, ensures 
consistency between the product and information about the product, and avoids the 
embarrassment of stakeholder dissatisfaction and complaint.  NASA adopts the 
configuration management principles as defined by ANSI/EIA 649, NASA methods of 
implementation as defined by NASA configuration management professionals, and as 
approved by NASA management.  For additional information, please see page 151 of the 
NASA handbook. 
 
39.  This project managed the identification, acquisition, access, protection, and 
distribution of technical data. 
 
Definition: The Technical Data Management Process is used to plan for, acquire, 
access, manage, protect, and use data of a technical nature to support, eventual 
retirement, and retention of appropriate technical, to include mission and science, data 
beyond system retirement as required by NPR 1441.1, NASA Records Retention 
Schedules.  The key aspects are: application of policies and procedures for data 
identification and control, timely and economical acquisition of technical data, assurance 
of the adequacy of data and its protection, facilitating access to distribution of the data to 
the point of use, analysis of data use, evaluation of data for future value to other 
programs/ projects, and process access to information written in legacy software.  For 
additional information, please see page 158 of the NASA handbook. 
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40. This project monitored technical progress and provided status updates in 
support of the systems engineering process. 
 
Definition: The Technical assessment is the crosscutting process used to help 
monitor technical progress of a program/project through Periodic Technical Reviews 
(PTRs).  It provides status information to support assessing system design, product 
realization, and technical management decisions.  For additional information, please see 
page 166 of the NASA handbook. 
 
41. This project employed established decision analysis processes regarding 
technical decisions, alternatives, and uncertainties impacting cost, schedule, and 
risk. 
 
Definition: Decision analysis offers individuals and organizations a methodology 
for making decisions; it also offers techniques for modeling decision problems 
mathematically and finding optimal decisions numerically.  For additional information, 
please see page 197 of the NASA handbook. 
 
51. I was very familiar with the details of the project during the project life cycle. 
 
52. I was a part of this project from the birth of the project through to the end of the 
project’s completion. 
 
53. I was professionally invested in the project. 
 
54. I was personally invested in the project. 
 
55. How many other projects were you involved with while working on this project? 
  
 Reasoning: For more information on questions 51 – 55, please see the “Systems 
Engineering for Life cycle of Complex Systems” on pages 302 – 317. 
 
56. Funding constraints positively impacted the project’s success. 
 
 Reasoning: This question is trying to learn about budget constraints, and measure 
the difficulties the project had in obtaining timely funding.  Whether or not the project 
has a capped budget at the outset, or worse, a budget constrained after the project has 
been given authority to proceed.  Project budgets normally follow a bell-shaped curve – 
initially low periodic funding (annually in the case of space projects) that grows in later 
years to a peak and then tapers off in the last years.  A constrained budget is one in 
which these period to period budget commitments from the sponsor exhibit an irregular 
pattern such as initial grown followed by stagnation or even decreases before picking up 
again.  For additional information, please see “Using our Right Brains to Improve Space 
Project Cost Estimating” on pages (1 – 16) and “Improving Space Project Cost 
Estimating with Engineering Management Variables” on pages (15 – 20).   
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57. Volatility of requirements positively impacted the project’s success. 
 
 Reasoning: This question looked at changes in what the project was originally 
intended to do from a mission point of view, and the degree to which the top-level 
requirements of the projects have been determined, documented and stabilized.  A project 
with requirements’ volatility is one in which the initial requirements were substantially 
changed after project start.  For additional information, please see “Using our Right 
Brains to Improve Space Project Cost Estimating” on pages (1 – 16) and “Improving 
Space Project Cost Estimating with Engineering Management Variables” on pages (15 – 
20).   
 
58. Team experience positively impacted the project’s success. 
 
Reasoning: The experience of the team is very rarely discussed, except in some 
lessons learned documents.  When the team experiences are discussed, they are almost 
always in glowing terms.  The familiarity of the project development team with the 
technologies being used in the specific design implementation of the mission gained from 
previous experience with similar missions.  For additional information, please see 
“Using our Right Brains to Improve Space Project Cost Estimating” on pages (1 – 16) 
and “Improving Space Project Cost Estimating with Engineering Management 
Variables” on pages (15 – 20).   
 
59. The level of testing positively impacted the project’s success. 
 
 Reasoning: The project manager decides how much testing to perform.  The 
amount of testing performed, versus analytical verification, should be positively 
correlated to cost.  While more testing tends to cost more, this variable rather obviously 
needs to be considered in relation to mission success rate.  Testing should be “right 
sized” in order to perform as cost effectively as possible while not jeopardizing project 
success.  For additional information, please see “Using our Right Brains to Improve 
Space Project Cost Estimating” on pages (1 – 16) and “Improving Space Project Cost 
Estimating with Engineering Management Variables” on pages (15 – 20).   
 
60. Development duration (in month) positively impacted the project’s success. 
 
 Reasoning: Schedule span is the date by which the project is ready for initial 
operating capability in relation to the start date.  Projects that are either required too 
quickly or are stretched out too far will presumably suffer budget inefficiencies.  For 
additional information, please see “Using our Right Brains to Improve Space Project 
Cost Estimating” on pages (1 – 16) and “Improving Space Project Cost Estimating with 
Engineering Management Variables” on pages (15 – 20).   
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61. The number of organizations involved positively impacted the project’s success. 
 
 Reasoning: We tabulated the number of distinct government laboratory, 
contractor, research institute and university organizations for each project and simply 
counted them.  We did not count organizations, which only worked on the spacecraft bus.  
Sometimes one organization worked on different aspects of the science part of the 
project.  The number of government sponsors such as NASA, DOD, NOAA, etc.), the 
number of prime contractors involved and the number of science organizations involved.  
More organizations would hypothetically complicate the project and drive cost and 
schedule.  For additional information, please see “Using our Right Brains to Improve 
Space Project Cost Estimating” on pages (1 – 16) and “Improving Space Project Cost 
Estimating with Engineering Management Variables” on pages (15 – 20).   
 
62. The degree of formulation study positively impacted the project’s success. 
 
Reasoning: Counted Phase A and B efforts and calculated the percent spent there 
as a function of the Phase C/D cost.  The amount of resources expended prior to the 
beginning of full-scale development on advancing the understanding of the complexities 
of the project development undertaking.  The hypothesis here was that projects that have 
spent more on formulation study would exhibit lower ultimate cost.  For additional 
information, please see “Using our Right Brains to Improve Space Project Cost 
Estimating” on pages (1 – 16) and “Improving Space Project Cost Estimating with 
Engineering Management Variables” on pages (15 – 20).   
 
63. The new design factor (development of new hardware for this project) positively 
impacted the project’s success. 
 
 Reasoning: The project manager makes a conscious decision on the extent to 
which he or she will use off-the-shelf hardware versus develop new hardware.  For 
additional information, please see “Using our Right Brains to Improve Space Project 
Cost Estimating” on pages (1 – 16). 
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APPENDIX C. NASA CENTER DESCRIPTIONS 
 
Center/ Facility Location Center/ Facility Description 
Ames Research 
Center 
Silicon Valley, 
California  
• Research and Development 
• Specializes in research geared towards 
creating new knowledge and new 
technologies that span the spectrum of 
NASA interests. 
• Focuses: Entry systems, Supercomputing, 
NextGen air transportation, Airborne 
Science, Low-Cost Missions, Biology & 
Astrobiology, Exoplanets, Autonomy & 
Robotics, Lunar Science, Human Factors, 
Wind Tunnels. 
 
Armstrong 
Flight Research 
Center 
Edwards, 
California 
 
• NASA’s primary center for atmospheric 
flight research and operations 
• Lead center for flight research, and 
innovates in aeronautics and space 
technology. 
 
Glenn Research 
Center Cleveland, Ohio 
 
• Research Center 
• Develops and transfers critical 
technologies that address national priorities 
through research, technologies that address 
national priorities through research, 
technology development, and systems 
development for safe and reliable 
aeronautics, aerospace, and space 
applications. 
 
Goddard Space 
Flight Center 
Greenbelt, 
Maryland 
 
• Robotics Center 
• Its mission is to expand knowledge on the 
Earth and its environment, the solar 
system, and the universe through 
observations from space. 
• Focuses: Earth Science, Astrophysics, 
Heliophysics, Planetary Science 
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Center/ Facility Location Center/Facility Description 
Jet Propulsion 
Laboratory 
Pasadena, 
California 
 
 
• Robotics Center 
• Managed by the California Institute of 
Technology, is NASA’s lead center for 
robotic exploration of the Solar System. 
 
Johnson Space 
Center Houston, Texas 
 
• Hub of human spaceflight activity for 50+ 
years 
• Home to ISS mission operations 
• Manned Spacecraft Center 
• Leads NASA’s effort in Human Space 
Exploration e.g., the Space Shuttle and 
International Space Station programs. 
 
Kennedy Space 
Center 
Cape Canaveral, 
Florida 
 
• Launching 
• Home to NASA’s Launch Service Program 
• Launches satellites and robotic missions 
• NASA’s lead center for preparing and 
launching missions around the Earth and 
beyond. 
 
Langley 
Research 
Center 
Hampton, 
Virginia 
 
• Research Center 
• Conducts aviation and space research for 
aerospace, atmospheric sciences, and 
technology commercialization. 
 
Marshall Space 
Flight Center 
Huntsville, 
Alabama 
 
• Field Center 
• Propulsion and space transportation 
• Engineering 
• Science 
• Space systems 
• Space operations 
• Project and program management 
• Leader in access to space and the use of 
space for research and development to 
benefit humanity. 
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Center/ Facility Location Center/ Facility Description 
Stennis Space 
Center 
Bay St. Louis, 
Mississippi 
 
 
• Rocket engine test complex 
• NASA’s program manager for rocket 
propulsion testing 
• Responsible for NASA’s rocket propulsion 
testing and for partnering with industry to 
develop and implement remote sensing 
technology. 
 
 
NASA 
Headquarters 
Washington, 
D.C. 
 
• Provides overall guidance and direction to 
the agency, under the leadership of the 
Administrator (Charles F. Bolden) 
 
Goddard 
Institute of 
Space Studies 
New York City, 
New York 
 
• Located at Columbia University 
• Managed by GSFC, focuses on research tat 
emphasize a broad study of global climate 
change. 
 
IV and V 
Facility 
Fairmont, West 
Virginia 
 
• Managed by GSFC, performs software IV 
& V for mission critical software and 
conducts research in software assurance 
technology. 
 
Michoud 
Assembly 
Facility 
New Orleans, 
Louisiana 
 
• Manufacture and assembly of critical 
hardware components for exploration 
vehicles under development at MSFC and 
other NASA centers 
 
NASA Shared 
Services Center Mississippi 
 
• Performs selected business activities for all 
NASA Centers in financial management, 
human resources, information technology, 
procurement and business support services 
• Located on grounds of Stennis Space 
Center 
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Location Center/Facility Center/ Facility Description 
Plum Brook 
Station Cleveland, Ohio 
 
• Located at Glenn Research Center 
• Space power facility 
• Spacecraft propulsion research facility 
• Cryogenic propellant tank facility 
• Cryogenic components laboratory 
• Hypersonic tunnel facility 
 
Wallops Flight 
Facility 
Wallops Island, 
Virginia 
 
• Management and implementation of 
suborbital research programs 
• Managed by GSFC, is NASA’s site for 
suborbital and small orbital flight projects, 
Earth Science research and technology 
development, and also operates a launch 
range. 
 
White Sands 
Test Facility 
Las Cruces, New 
Mexico 
 
• Conducts simulated mission duty cycle 
testing to develop numerous full-scale 
propulsion systems 
• Managed by JSC, provides the expertise 
and infrastructure to safely test and 
evaluate spacecraft materials, components, 
and rocket propulsion systems. 
 
 
 Sources: (Jansma, 2008); www.nasa.gov   
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